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ABSTRACT 
The defendants in Philip Morris USA v. Williams and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes claimed a right to present defenses. The defendants also both claimed that the 
mechanisms in place in those cases—the consideration of nonparties in imposing punitive 
damages and the use of sampling to litigate a large class action—violated that right. The 
Supreme Court agreed, a death knell for the advocated use of both mechanisms to coun-
teract tort law’s under-litigation problem: the fact that not all injured persons sue, pre-
cluding tort law’s ability to achieve effective deterrence. 
This Article argues that procedural due process theories do not support such a right. 
The process-based theory provides only a flexible level of participation and the defendants 
in both Philip Morris and Dukes had a meaningful opportunity to participate. The out-
come-based theory also does not support such a right because the total damage obliga-
tions produced by the mechanisms are actually accurate. Even though no procedural due 
process right precludes the consideration of nonparties and sampling, the mechanisms are 
still problematic because of how they shift the burden of proof. The burden, however, is 
based in substantive law; substantive law can be changed to help alleviate the harmful 
effects of tort law’s under-litigation problem. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the beneficial effects of civil law is that it indirectly regulates conduct. A 
manufacturer is dissuaded from falsely representing the safety of its products because, if 
someone is injured by that misrepresentation, the manufacturer will have to pay damages 
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in tort. An employer is dissuaded from discriminating against female employees because, 
if it does so, the employer will again have to pay damages. Not only do the individual 
victims benefit from the lawsuits, but society does also. The threat of these lawsuits and 
the actual lawsuits filed help prevent conduct that harms society, conduct like lying and 
discrimination. 
This beneficial effect, however, assumes that injured persons sue, but that is not the 
reality. For whatever reason, injured persons do not take advantage of the tort system. 
Because of this, injured persons will not receive any compensation for their injuries. Also, 
without the lawsuits, the law loses its deterrent effect. 
Class actions and creative use of punitive damages are two potential solutions to tort 
law’s under-litigation problem. Class actions help solve the problem by aggregating all 
injured persons’ claims. If the class of injured persons is large enough, the claims could 
be litigated using sampling, where a sampling of the plaintiffs’ claims are tried and the 
results are applied to the class as a whole. Punitive damages can help the problem by pun-
ishing the defendant for harming nonparty injured persons. Through both mechanisms, the 
defendant should end up paying something close to the total harm it caused, restoring the 
law’s deterrent effect. 
How these mechanisms restore the deterrent effect, however, is problematic. Both 
assume liability. If sampling is used in a class action, the defendant’s liability to those 
plaintiffs whose claims are not tried is assumed. If the defendant is punished for harming 
nonparties in a punitive damages award, the defendant’s liability to those injured nonpar-
ties is assumed. 
These liability assumptions were at issue in two recent United States Supreme Court 
cases: Philip Morris USA v. Williams1 and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.2 In both cases, 
the defendants claimed a “right” to a procedural protection. That right was to present de-
fenses to the claims of injured persons whose claims were not tried and to present defenses 
specific to those plaintiffs to whom the defendant’s liability was assumed. In both cases, 
the Court found such a right, crippling these potential solutions to the under-litigation 
problem. 
The underlying theories of procedural due process, however, do not support such a 
right. The first main theory of procedural due process is process-based, under which par-
ticipation is valued regardless of its effect on the outcome. This theory seems fitting for a 
right to present defenses—a right to further participate. But it does support such a right 
because these defendants could already meaningfully participate and influence the out-
come, even if unable to present the exact evidence desired. 
The second main theory of procedural due process is an outcome-based theory, un-
der which a procedure is required if it is necessary to achieve accurate results. An outcome-
based procedural due process sentiment is apparent in both Dukes and Philip Morris as the 
Court seems concerned about the accuracy of simply assuming liability. To correct this 
inaccuracy, the Court mandated individualized proceedings in both cases. 
                                                          
 1. Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).  
 2. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
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But an outcome-based theory does not actually support the existence of this claimed 
right. The proper utilitarian test asks if the benefits of the procedure justify its costs. Indi-
vidualized proceedings may seem to add substantial value in the added accuracy, but the 
due process interest at stake is a defendant’s obligation to pay damages. Even if sampling 
and considering nonparties inaccurately assume liability, both mechanisms still produce 
accurate total damage obligations. Thus, mandating individualized proceeding actually 
adds little consequential benefit. Plus, the costs of individualized proceedings are enor-
mous; if individualized proceedings are the only option, potential plaintiffs are unlikely to 
pursue relief. This hurts injured persons and society generally as defendants lose the in-
centive to alter tortious behavior. Under the proper utilitarian balancing test, a defendant 
lacks an outcome-based due process right to present defenses. 
Although no procedural due process right precludes the use of sampling and consid-
ering nonparties, there is a problem with these mechanisms—they implicitly shift the bur-
den of proof as defined by the substantive law. The good news, however, with respect to 
the possibility of curing the under-litigation problem is that, unlike a procedural due pro-
cess right, the substantive law can be changed. 
Part II of this Article explores tort law’s under-litigation problem and how it hampers 
the deterrent effect of the law. Part III details Philip Morris and Dukes and explains the 
Court’s conclusions that a right to present defenses existed in each case. Part IV describes 
the theories underlying procedural due process, and Part V argues that these theories do 
not support a right to present defenses. Part VI explores how sampling and considering 
nonparties are still problematic because they shift the burden of proof, but also argues that 
changes to the substantive law could rewrite those burdens and alleviate the effects of the 
under-litigation problem. 
II. DETERRENCE AND THE UNDER-LITIGATION PROBLEM 
One goal of tort law is deterrence—to deter both the individual defendant and oth-
ers.3 Ideally, the possibility of tort liability would discourage would-be defendants from 
committing torts.4 Or, the fact of tort liability would deter the defendant from continuing 
its tortious conduct based on the risk that others injured will sue.5 
A. For Whatever Reason, People Do Not Sue 
Tort law’s ability to achieve deterrence, of course, depends on injured persons actu-
ally filing tort claims. If injured persons do not sue, there is no possibility or fact of tort 
liability to deter the defendant and would-be defendants. 
It may surprise some to learn, but tort law has an under-litigation problem: In reality, 
                                                          
 3. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, HORNBOOK SERIES § 11, at 19 (2000). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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far from all injured persons file suit.6 Why not? Maybe people are uncomfortable or unfa-
miliar with the legal system, as Judge Guido Calabresi suggests.7 Maybe people do not 
realize that their injury was caused by someone, and that they have a potential legal claim 
against that same someone.8 Or, maybe people would just rather not.9 For whatever reason 
or reasons, injured persons do not sue. 
And as long as “many of those who are injured do not seek redress,” defendants will 
not “internalize the full cost of their tortious conduct.”10 Defendants will not consider that 
if they commit tortious conduct X, they will end up paying damages to all those injured 
by X. Instead, only a few injured will sue over X. Why refrain from tortious conduct X, 
and the possible profit of X, when the defendant will end up paying for only a few of the 
injuries it causes? The under-litigation problem negates the disincentive that tort law tries 
to create. If injured persons do not sue, tort liability does not and cannot deter. 
B. Filling the Gap Caused by Those Who Do Not Sue 
1. How to Use Punitive Damages and Class Actions to Help Solve the Under-
Litigation Problem 
Both punitive damages and class action litigation are solutions to the under-litigation 
problem. Punitive damages can fix this problem by making sure the tortfeasor bears the 
full costs of its harmful acts by considering the likelihood that the defendant will escape 
                                                          
 6. Professor Roger Cramton summarized the results of an American Bar Foundation study conducted in 
1974 and updated in 1989 showing how few legal claims are actually filed: 
Individuals report that only a portion of their “legal problems” are taken to lawyers, a 
percentage that is highly variable. For example, 1 percent of job discrimination problems 
are taken to a lawyer; 10% of tort problems; 36% of real property problems; and 73% of 
estate planning problems (wills). The four largest categories of work actually taken to 
lawyers by individuals involve real property, estate planning, marital problems, and torts, 
in that order.  
Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 542-43 
(1994); see also id. at 542 n.30 (discussing that a Harvard Medical Practice Study confirmed the under-litigation 
of tort medical malpractice claims in that about one out of every seven people injured by potential medical mal-
practice file suit); Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris v. Williams, 27 REV. LITIG. 9, 31 
n.52 (2007) (noting a 1991 New England Journal of Medicine Study finding that “roughly one out of seven 
patients injured by medical malpractice caused by negligence brings suit”). 
 7. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, Circuit Justice, concurring). 
Professor Roger Cramton summarizes these reasons why injured persons do not seek attorneys: 
Some of the possible reasons for unserved need are: (1) individuals lack information about 
the legal character of a problem or the value of a lawyer's help in dealing with it; (2) they do 
not know how to find a lawyer qualified to handle the problem; (3) they believe they cannot 
afford a lawyer's help; (4) they lack the resources to pay even a small or reasonable legal fee; 
and, perhaps most important, (5) lay persons fear lawyers and legal proceedings, with at-
tendant loss of control over their own lives. 
Cramton, supra note 6, at 542-43 (internal citations omitted). 
 8. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
869, 888 (1998). 
 9. Thomas C. Galligan, The Risks of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in Torts, 70 MO. L. REV. 691, 703 
(2005) (“[S]ome people may prefer to do other things than sue, such as to go to the movies, watch TV, or play 
video games.”). 
 10. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court's Recent Punitive Damages Deci-
sions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 880, 883 (2008). 
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liability for its same tortious conduct committed against persons other than the plaintiff.11 
If a defendant is likely to be sued only by 25 percent of the people injured by the defend-
ant’s product, consider the uncompensated 75 percent in calculating the punitive damage 
award.12 This minimizes the effect of those who do not sue. The defendant should pay, in 
one judgment, an amount close to the total harm it caused to all injured parties; the same 
amount it would pay if all injured persons sued.13 This should help negate the effects of 
the under-litigation problem. 
“[L]ike punitive damages, class actions are premised on the idea that defendants will 
face less than full liability—and less than optimal deterrence—if all injured parties do not 
sue.”14 A common reason an injured party may not sue is if the available relief is minimal, 
making the lawsuit economically inefficient. A class action aggregates those individual 
claims, making the relief sought larger and the lawsuit economically worthwhile:  
 
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome 
the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any 
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class 
action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential 
recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) la-
bor.15 
 
Briefly, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), a party seeking class certifica-
tion must demonstrate: 
 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims 
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims and 
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.16 
 
Assuming the party can show these requirements, the party must still fit into one of the 
                                                          
 11. Id. at 890-91. 
 12. Under the cost internalization method of calculating punitive damages, the defendant should end up pay-
ing the total amount of harm it has caused. If the defendant has a 50% chance of escaping liability, the amount 
of his damages should be doubled. Under the gain elimination method, the amount of punitive damages should 
similarly be multiplied based on the chances of escaping liability. 
 13. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 954 (arguing that punitive damages should be calculated based on 
the amount of compensatory damages “multiplied by a factor reflecting the likelihood of escaping liability”); see 
also Brief for Keith N. Hylton et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 
549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 2688793, at *23 (also advocating the factoring in of the defend-
ant’s chances of escaping liability within his gain elimination formula).      
 14. Scheuerman, supra note 10, at 893. The two mechanisms cannot be combined, however. “By definition, 
a properly certified class will obtain compensatory damages that reflect the total harm of the defendant's wrongful 
conduct.” Id. at 934. 
 15. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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three types of classes enumerated in Rule 23(b).17 Regardless of which type of class 
though, most courts are also concerned with whether a class action could be manageably 
litigated; “no court would certify a class unless it believed that the case could proceed in 
a manageable fashion.”18 
One way to litigate a very large class action is sampling. The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the use of sampling in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos.19 Hilao involved a class of approximately 
10,000 people seeking relief for human rights abuses.20 The district court used sampling to 
determine the amount of compensatory damages.21 One hundred and thirty-seven of the 
9,541 claims were randomly selected by computer to be tried.22 The amount chosen was 
based on expert testimony that “examination of a random sample of 137 claims would 
achieve ‘a 95 percent statistical probability that the same percentage determined to be valid 
among the examined claims would be applicable to the totality of claims filed.’”23 A court-
appointed special master evaluated those claims and found six invalid due to insufficient 
proof and evidence, a 4.37% invalidity rate.24 He then recommended the amount of dam-
ages to be awarded to the 131 successful claims left in the sampling and used those num-
bers to determine an average award depending on the injury.25 He then rounded the inva-
lidity rate to 5% and applied it to the other claims that were not tried.26 Once he determined 
the total number of valid claims using the invalidity rate, he multiplied that number by the 
average award to determine the total compensatory damage award for the class.27 
The jury was presented with evidence explaining the statistical approach and evi-
dence specific to the tried claims.28 The special master also explained his recommenda-
tions, and the jury was free to reject those recommendations.29 The jury found only two of 
the sampled claims invalid and reached different compensatory damage awards than the 
                                                          
 17. A 23(b)(1) class is available when separate actions may leave the defendant vulnerable to multiple, in-
consistent judgments or when separate actions may substantially impair nonparties from protecting their own 
interests. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). A 23(b)(2) class is available when injunctive remedies are appropriate. Id. at 
23(b)(2). A 23(b)(3) class is available when common questions of law or fact predominate and a class action is 
superior to other procedural vehicles. Id. at 23(b)(3). 
 18. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 173 (N.D. Cal. 2004), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
 19. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 603 
F.3d 571, 625–26 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (referencing a Ninth Circuit decision that af-
firmed the procedure used in Hilao; a district court in the Fifth Circuit tried the same in a consolidation of 160 
asbestos cases, but the Fifth Circuit reversed); Alexandra Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 571, 609 (2012) [hereinafter Lahav, Trial by Formula] (“In the late 1990’s, a few trial courts experimented 
with binding statistical-adjudication procedures.”). See generally Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 
319 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that sampling would violate the defendant’s due process and jury trial rights). Lahav, 
Trial by Formula, supra, at 610 (“No trial court has followed in the footsteps of these innovators, and the appel-
late courts continue to express hostility to mandatory statistical adjudication of this type.”). 
 20. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 21. Id. at 782. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 783 n.8. 
 25. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 783. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 784. 
 29. Id. 
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special master for the sampled claims.30 The plaintiffs with the valid sampled claims re-
ceived the actual amounts awarded by the jury.31 The plaintiffs with the invalid sampled 
claims received no damages.32 The claimants with the non-tried claims were eligible to 
receive the aggregated award that was calculated using the 5% invalidity rate and the av-
erage awards.33 The aggregated award was distributed to the claimants with the non-tried 
claims pro rata.34 
For whatever reason, despite sampling possibly making large class actions manage-
able, courts have use it only rarely.35 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the use of sampling in 
Hilao. The Fifth Circuit rejected its use in In re Fibreboard Corp.36 
2. Implicitly Assuming Liability 
Part of why considering nonparties in imposing punitive damages and using sam-
pling in class actions are able to alleviate the effects of the under-litigation problem is 
because they assume liability. More specifically, both considering nonparties and sam-
pling involve non-tried claims. For punitive damages, a nonparty’s claim is not litigated 
in the specific plaintiff’s case against the tortfeasor. In sampling, the vast majority of the 
class action plaintiffs’ claims are not tried. 
Despite the non-trial of these injured persons’ claims, the defendant becomes obli-
gated to pay relief as if it would be liable to those injured persons, both nonparties and 
class action plaintiffs. The punitive damage award imposed assumes that the defendant 
would be liable to nonparties and deserves punishment for that. The relief resulting from 
sampling includes payment obligations to class action plaintiffs as if the defendant had 
been found liable to those class action plaintiffs. The defendant is assumed to be liable to 
the injured persons even though the injured persons never tried their claims. 
The under-litigation is solved because there is no need for injured persons to file 
suit. Instead, considering nonparties and sampling assume that if those injured persons 
sued, they would win. Both force the defendant to pay damages based on that assumption. 
III. PHILIP MORRIS & DUKES DESCRIBED 
Because injured parties’ claims are not tried, the defendant never has the ability to 
present defenses or evidence specific to those injured parties (nonparties or class action 
plaintiffs whose claims are not tried). This inability to present defenses is the issue the 
Court confronted in both Philip Morris and Dukes. 
                                                          
 30. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 784. 
 31. Id. at 784 n.10. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 784 & n.10. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Lahav, Trial by Formula, supra note 19, at 609. 
 36. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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A. Philip Morris USA v. Williams37 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams was a basic tobacco products lawsuit.38 The plaintiff, 
the widow of a man who died from lung cancer, brought negligence and fraud claims 
against Philip Morris.39 The fraud claims were based on the defendant’s false representa-
tions “that there was a legitimate controversy about whether there was a connection be-
tween cigarette smoking and human health.”40 The plaintiff further alleged that the defend-
ant made these representations “[intending] to encourage smokers to continue to smoke 
and not to make the necessary effort to stop smoking.”41 The jury found the defendant 
liable for negligence and fraud.42 
This case stands out as not just another tobacco lawsuit, however, because of the 
punitive damage award the jury imposed for the defendant’s fraud—$79.5 million.43 That 
award was the reason this case eventually made it to the United States Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions, one of which was whether a punitive 
damage award could constitutionally punish the defendant for harming nonparty victims.44 
At trial, defendant requested a jury instruction that addressed the relevance of smok-
ers other than the plaintiff’s deceased husband: 
 
The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable relationship to the 
harm caused to Jesse Williams by the defendant’s punishable miscon-
duct. Although you may consider the extent of harm suffered by others 
in determining what that reasonable relationship is, you are not to punish 
the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons, 
who may bring lawsuits of their own in which other juries can resolve 
their claims and award punitive damages for those harms, as such other 
juries see fit.45 
 
Defendant claimed this instruction was necessary to ensure the jury properly con-
sidered the plaintiff’s attorney’s comments regarding how many other people in Oregon 
smoked, how ten out of every hundred smokers was likely to die because of smoking, and 
how Defendant maintained one-third of the market share of cigarettes.46 The trial court 
                                                          
 37. Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 38. Id.  
 39. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), vacated sub nom., Philip Morris 
USA Inc. v. Williams, 124 S. Ct. 56 (2003). 
 40. Id. at 832.  
 41. Id. at 832–33. 
 42. Id. at 828. 
 43. Id.; Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 350 (2007) (the trial court found the award imposed 
by the jury “excessive” and reduced it to $32 million); Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d at 842 (the Oregon Court of 
Appeals later reinstated the entire $79.5 million award).  
 44. Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 352. 
 45. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1175 (Or. 2006), vacated sub nom, Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
 46. Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 350. The plaintiff’s attorney made these references in closing argument. 
Joint Appendix, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 2147483, at 
*197a (“It's fair to think about how many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years in the State of Oregon there 
9
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rejected the defendant’s proposed instruction and instead instructed the jury that the pur-
poses of punitive damages are to punish and deter misconduct and that they “are not in-
tended to compensate the plaintiff or anyone else for damages caused by the defendant’s 
conduct.”47 The jury, after being so instructed, imposed the $79.5 million punitive damage 
award.48 
Before the Oregon and the United States Supreme Courts, the defendant claimed that 
the trial court’s refusal to give its proposed instruction created a “significant likelihood 
that a portion of the $79.5 million award represented punishment for its having harmed 
others”49 and that such a punishment would be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court 
agreed. “[T]he Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages 
award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they 
directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to 
the litigation.”50 
The Court concluded that the Due Process Clause requires this result because a state 
cannot “[punish] an individual without first providing that individual with ‘an opportunity 
to present every available defense.’”51 Applied to the facts, Philip Morris never had the 
opportunity to present defenses to the nonparties’ potential claims, defenses like the non-
parties’ potential non-reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations or the nonparties’ 
knowledge of the dangers of smoking.52 
The Due Process Clause also requires this result because “to permit punishment for 
injuring a nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive dam-
ages equation.”53 Applied to the facts, how many nonparties would be considered? Only 
                                                          
have been. It's more than fair to think about how many more are out there in the future.”). In the plaintiff’s rebuttal 
closing argument, the attorney also commented: 
In Oregon, how many people do we see outside, driving home, coming to work, over the 
lunch hour smoking cigarettes? For every hundred, cigarettes that they smoke are going to 
kill ten through lung cancer. And of those ten, four of them, or three of them I should say, 
because the market share of Marlboros is one-third of the market.  
Market share of Philip Morris is almost 50 percent of that. But three of the hundred 
are going to die from smoking Marlboros. The other seven are going to die from something 
else. Another Philip Morris brand? Brown and Williamson? R.J.R.? They aren't here. 
Id. at *199a.  
 47. Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 351 (internal citations omitted). 
 48. Id. at 350. 
 49. Id. at 351; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 
352 (2003) (explaining the “increasingly common phenomenon” of juries awarding significant punitive damages 
in a single plaintiff case, which made the single plaintiff cases “similar to class action cases in that punitive 
damages are in essence assessed on a putative ‘classwide’ basis for harms actually or potentially inflicted upon 
numerous individuals”).   
 50. Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 353. Even though punishing the defendant for harming nonparties is 
unconstitutional, evidence of that harm is relevant to show that the defendant’s conduct was reprehensible. Id. at 
355. Based on the common law, conduct must be reprehensible for punitive damages to be available. BMW of 
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). And a high punitive damage award is more likely to be consti-
tutional if the level of reprehensibility is high. Id. at 582. In Philip Morris, the Court made clear that the plaintiff 
is free to present evidence of nonparty harm because it is relevant to reprehensibility. Philip Morris USA, 549 
U.S. at 355. The Court was also clear, however, that states must use procedures to ensure that the jury does not 
use evidence of the defendant’s harming nonparties as a basis for punishing the defendant. Id. at 357. 
 51. Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 353. 
 52. Id. at 353-54.  
 53. Id. at 354. 
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those injured to the same degree as the named deceased plaintiff, Jesse Williams? Those 
deceased and those seriously injured? Unless the trial court answered these questions, 
“[t]he jury [would] be left to speculate,” increasing the “risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty, 
and lack of notice.”54 
Justice Stevens dissented in Philip Morris because of the punitive damage context; 
he did not believe that punitive damages should be limited to what the defendant did to the 
plaintiff, thus allowing the damage award to encompass the defendant’s harming nonpar-
ties.55 His analysis indicates that he might have ruled differently if the issue was not puni-
tive relief: “To award compensatory damages to remedy such third-party harm might well 
constitute a taking of property from the defendant without due process.”56 That insufficient 
process might include the defendant’s lack of opportunity to present defenses. If so, this 
reasoning foreshadows what the Court later held in Dukes. 
B. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes57 
The class of plaintiffs in Dukes also sought punitive damages, but that is not the 
reason the case reached the Supreme Court.58 The Court agreed to hear the case to evaluate 
whether the class of plaintiffs could be certified as a class action.59 The lower court certi-
fied a class comprising of “about one and a half million plaintiffs, current and former fe-
male employees of petitioner Wal-Mart who allege that the discretion exercised by their 
local supervisors over pay and promotion matters violates Title VII.”60 The proposed class 
sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, back-pay, and punitive damages.61 
To show commonality—that questions of law or fact common to the class existed—
the Dukes plaintiffs relied on: 1) “statistical evidence about pay and promotion disparities 
between men and women at the company”; 2) “anecdotal reports of discrimination from 
about 120 of Wal-Mart’s female employees”; and 3) the testimony of a sociologist who 
analyzed Wal-Mart’s “‘culture’ and personnel practices” and concluded that Wal-Mart 
was “‘vulnerable’ to gender discrimination.”62 The lower courts found this evidence suffi-
cient to show commonality.63 Additionally, the plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 
23(b)(2), requiring them to show that the defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”64 
The lower court also evaluated the manageability of the proposed class action given 
                                                          
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 357-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to punitive damages as punishing for the “public harm” 
caused by the defendant’s conduct). 
 56. Phillip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 359.  
 57. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 2547.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2549. 
 63. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2004), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
 64. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2549. Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is a mandatory class, meaning class members 
cannot opt-out. See In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 417 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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the size of the proposed class. The trial court explained that the standard approach to em-
ployment discrimination class actions is to bifurcate the trial into a liability and a remedy 
stage.65 In the liability stage, “plaintiffs are required to prove that the defendant engaged 
in a pattern or practice of discrimination against the class.”66 At the trial court, Wal-Mart 
argued that due process required mini individual trials in the liability stage.67 But the trial 
court did not agree, concluding that individualization is not necessary because the focus at 
this stage is “a company-wide pattern or practice.”68 
The remedy stage posed more manageability problems. Even if the plaintiffs can 
prove that the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, the plaintiffs 
are not all automatically entitled to monetary relief. Only the class members who can show 
they were actually harmed by the discrimination are eligible to receive lost pay.69 The 
amount of that lost pay must also be determined.70 Those determinations are normally 
made in individualized mini-trials.71 The plaintiff has only a minimal burden.72 She must 
show that she was qualified but denied for a promotion, as opposed to showing that the 
denial was because of discrimination.73 If the plaintiff can meet this minimal burden to 
show eligibility, the burden shifts to the employer, who then can put forth individual af-
firmative defenses or show that the employee was denied an opportunity for a lawful rea-
son.74 
Individualized mini-trials were obviously not possible for the female employees. 
The trial court concluded that Wal-Mart’s corporate records could be used to determine 
who was eligible to receive relief and the amount of that relief, making the proposed class 
action manageable.75 
                                                          
 65. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 173-74. 
 66. Id.; see also HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE, HORNBOOK SERIES § 3.25, 240 (2001).   
 67. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 173-74. The trial court rejected that argument and discussed that Wal-Mart could 
defend itself in the liability phase by showing that its “more decentralized store sub-unit by store sub-unit statis-
tical analysis refutes the existence of any company-wide policy of discrimination” and by presenting other evi-
dence that would rebut Plaintiff’s claim of a centralized, nationwide policy. Id.  
 68. The court explained that the liability stage “focuses on the existence (or not) of a company-wide pattern 
or practice of discrimination against the class” and “the class is not required to prove that each member suffered 
discrimination.” Id. at 174. 
 69. Id. at 175. “These proceedings typically consist of mini-hearings presided over by a special master or the 
court. While the burden on individual class members at this point is minimal, they must at least identify them-
selves and make some showing (less than a prima facie case) that they suffered an adverse employment decision.” 
Id. at 175-76. If the individual class member can show an adverse employment decision, the “burden then shifts 
to the employer to prove that the class member was denied the job or promotion for lawful reasons.” Id. at 176. 
 70. Id. at 175. 
 71. Id. at 175-76. 
 72. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 176. 
 73. Id. The trial court determined that Wal-Mart’s records could be used to determine which class members 
were qualified for job openings. Id. at 180. This same information, however, would not demonstrate that the class 
members were actually interested in a job opening. Id. Wal-Mart lacked any records documenting interest for 
many positions because it did not have a comprehensive system of posting and accepting applications for many 
positions. Id. If no such information existed, the trial court found no manageable method to try the class members’ 
eligibility. Id. at 181. But for those positions that Wal-Mart did have this information, the eligibility phase could 
be tried using that information. Id. at 182.  
 74. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). 
 75. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 184–85. 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s certification of the proposed class.76 It 
did not comment on the trial court’s specific plans to use Wal-Mart’s corporate records 
but noted that “there are a range of possibilities . . . that would allow this class action to 
proceed in a manner that is both manageable and in accordance with due process.”77 As an 
example of one of those possibilities, the Ninth Circuit mentioned sampling and cited Hi-
lao.78 There was no reason “why a similar procedure to that used in Hilao could not be 
employed” in Dukes.79 Thus, “there [existed] at least one method of managing this large 
class action that, albeit somewhat imperfect, nonetheless protects the due process rights of 
all involved parties.”80 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s certification of the class, finding 
that the proposed class could not show commonality.81 At the end of the opinion, the Court 
also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “Trial by Formula” suggestion for managing the litiga-
tion.82 The Court described the proposed sampling solution and quickly noted its “[disap-
proval of] that novel project.”83 Trying only a random sampling of the claims and applying 
those results to the rest of the class is impermissible because it would deprive Wal-Mart 
of “individualized determinations of each employee’s eligibility for backpay,” to which 
Wal-Mart is “entitled.”84 
The Supreme Court focused on the remedy stage of an employment discrimination 
class action where the individual plaintiff must show her eligibility for a promotion. These 
individualized determinations will simply not occur in sampling, where all claims are not 
tried. Without individualized determinations, Wal-Mart would be deprived of its “[entitle-
ment] to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.”85 The Rules Enabling Act 
mandates that Rule 23, the rule allowing claims to proceed as a class action, cannot 
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”86 Rule 23 can thus not be used to de-
prive Wal-Mart of its “right” to present defenses to the individual employees’ claims. 
IV. THE UNDERLYING, THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides that no person “shall be 
                                                          
 76. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). The Court later reheard the case en banc and affirmed the district court. See 
generally Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
 77. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 625. 
 78. Id. at 625–26.  
 79. Id. at 627.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2556–57. The Court defined commonality to mean that “[t]heir claims 
must depend on a common contention—for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same 
supervisor.” Id. at 2551. The plaintiffs, however, were unable to point to any common reason for the employment 
decisions that allegedly disfavored women—there was no issue central to the validity of each class member’s 
discrimination claim. Wal-Mart’s policy gave discretion to local supervisors and plaintiffs were unable to show 
that any common mode of exercising that discretion existed. Id. at 2554. Necessarily, one supervisor’s decision 
had little to do with another’s. Id. at 2554–55.  
 82. Id. at 2561.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (emphasis added). 
 85. Id.  
 86. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2011)). 
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deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”87 In the civil context, a 
person cannot be deprived of property without receiving some procedural protections. 
What procedural protections are required, however, is not set in stone. Due process “is not 
a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”88 
To the contrary, due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands.”89 
The need for and extent of procedural protections can also vary depending on the 
underlying theory of why procedures are necessary in the first place. Generally speaking, 
two types of procedural due process theories exist: outcome-based and process-based.90 
The Supreme Court used a process-based theory of due process to recognize a plaintiff’s 
right to day in court. 
A. The Outcome-Based Theory 
An outcome-based theory is concerned with improving the accuracy of an out-
come.91 “The procedural system is designed to ensure that in each case the substantively 
correct outcome actually issues.”92 Procedures are a “means of assuring that the society’s 
agreed-upon rules of conduct . . . are in fact accurately and consistently followed”; the 
purpose of procedures “is less to assure participation than to use participation to assure 
accuracy.”93 This is an instrumental theory, where procedures are just instruments to 
achieve accuracy: “notice, hearing, and right to counsel are valuable because they contrib-
ute to the goals of accuracy.”94 
Perfect accuracy might be ideal, but it is not the goal. Practically, perfect accuracy 
is not possible.95 Regardless, if there were a right to a perfectly accurate outcome, we 
would be able to demand that accuracy regardless of cost.96 “Any system that recognized 
                                                          
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 88. Cafeteria Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
 89. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
 90. Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court 
Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1889 (2009). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 244 (2004); see also Robert G. Bone, 
Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 201 (1992) [hereinafter 
Bone, Rethinking] (“An outcome-oriented theory evaluates participation for what it adds to the quality of the 
outcome.”); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Proce-
dural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476 (1986) (“According to the instrumental conception of due process, 
the purpose of the clause is to ensure the most accurate decision possible.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative 
Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 895 (1981) (describing the dominant due 
process analysis as instrumental, determining the “goodness of a procedure . . . by assessing its capacity for 
accurate factfinding and appropriate application of substantive legal norms to the facts as found.”). With respect 
to that accurate outcome, “[m]ost conventional accounts assume that the relevant outcome of adjudication is the 
final judgment, consisting of the legal remedy and the determination of legal and factual issues, and that the 
proper measure of outcome quality is the degree to which the decision accurately reflects the underlying facts 
and conforms to pre-existing norms.” Bone, Rethinking, supra, at 201. 
 93. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666-67 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis in original).  
 94. Redish & Marshall, supra note 92, at 476. 
 95. Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1017 (2010) [hereinafter Bone, 
Procedure] (“Obviously, parties cannot have a right to perfect accuracy since perfection is impossible.”). 
 96. Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 561, 599 (1993) [hereinafter Bone, Statistical Adjudication] (“[I]f a substantive right implied a 
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such a right [to perfect accuracy] could easily find itself morally committed to a disastrous 
level of financing for adjudication.”97 Instead, the analysis recognizes a flexible idea of 
accuracy and is utilitarian: comparing the procedure’s likely production of accurate out-
comes versus the procedure’s costs.98 If the benefits with respect to accuracy outweigh the 
costs, then due process requires that procedure.99 
The Supreme Court used this very analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge.100 In Mathews, 
the plaintiff had been receiving Social Security benefits due to his disability.101 The state 
agency later determined, however, that his disability had ceased, and terminated his pay-
ments.102 The recipient challenged the constitutionality of the procedures the government 
used within its decision to terminate his benefits.103 
The Court explained that “[p]rocedural due process imposes constraints on govern-
ment decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests.”104 At the 
same time, “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the partic-
ular situation demands” depending on the interests affected.105 Specifically, the Court iden-
tified the interests to be weighed: 
 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
                                                          
right to a perfectly accurate outcome, parties would be entitled to demand that the community invest resources 
in procedure at a level that maximized accuracy regardless of cost.”); see also Bone, Procedure, supra note 95, 
at 1017 (“[I]f the right guaranteed perfect accuracy, every case would involve a rights violation, which hardly 
fits common intuitions of procedural fairness.”); Solum, supra note 92, at 247 (“If we were to make perfect 
accuracy our higher commitment, we would find that as we got closer and closer to our goal, the cost of reducing 
the marginal rate of error would become higher and higher. We would reach a point where society would be 
required to invest enormous resources for an infinitesimal gain in accuracy.”). 
 97. Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 96, at 599. 
 98. Bone, Procedure, supra note 95, at 1017. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Commentators agree that “Mathews v. Eldrige and its progeny 
are all but explicit in their utilitarianism.” Solum, supra note 92, at 254; see also Patrick Woolley, The Availa-
bility of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 414 (2000) (de-
scribing that the Mathews test has “usually been viewed solely as a means to ensure procedures whose accuracy 
is commensurate with the interests at stake”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for 
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 28, 48 (1976) (“The Eldridge Court . . . views the sole purpose of procedural protections as enhancing 
accuracy, and thus limits its calculus to the benefits or costs that flow from correct or incorrect decisions.”); 
Harvey Rochman, Note, Due Process: Accuracy or Opportunity?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2705, 2734 (1992) (“[T]o 
understand what is really going on in procedural due process decisions and to predict what the Supreme Court 
will do, it is necessary to think principally in terms of accuracy.”); see also Redish & Marshall, supra note 92, at 
472 (“The word ‘fairness’ did not appear in the [Mathews] balancing test; the Court apparently chose to focus 
upon considerations of economic efficiency instead.”). 
 101. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323. 
 102. Id. at 324. 
 103. Id. at 324–25.  
 104. Id. at 332. 
 105. Id. at 334. 
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that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.106 
 
The Court found the private interest at issue was the uninterrupted receipt of disa-
bility benefits, which was not based on financial need.107 The Court also found only a 
limited risk of erroneous deprivation given the detailed questionnaires that the agency al-
ready used.108 Although a hearing may be helpful, “procedural due process rules are shaped 
by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases” 
and “[t]he potential value of an evidentiary hearing” was minimal.109 Last, the Court 
looked to the “incremental [costs] resulting from the increased number of hearings and the 
expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending decision.”110 Ultimately, the 
Court determined that a hearing is not constitutionally required before a recipient’s disa-
bility benefits may be terminated.111 
B. The Process-Based Theory 
Commentators were not impressed with the Court’s utilitarian approach to proce-
dural due process. After Mathews, “[t]he unifying thread in the literature [was] the percep-
tion that the effects of process on participants, not just the rationality of substantive results, 
must be considered.”112 Generally, commentators introduced process-based theories fo-
cused on the “value in permitting individuals to participate in the adjudication of the 
rights.”113 Enabling participation not only creates “the much-acclaimed appearance of jus-
tice,” but because of the intrinsic value of the participation itself, enabling that participa-
tion is “the very essence of justice.”114 
There are numerous values underlying the process-based theory of procedural due 
process—namely, the litigant’s autonomy and dignity, the legitimacy of the results of the 
adjudication, and the equality of participation opportunities for all litigants. These values, 
however, do not translate to any set extent of guaranteed participation, as is reflected in 
the Court’s delineation of a plaintiff’s right to her day in court. 
                                                          
 106. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. For cases involving only private parties, the Court refined the third factor to 
focus primarily on the plaintiff’s interest along with consideration of the government’s interest. See Connecticut 
v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2112 (1991). 
 107. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-41. 
 108. Id. at 345. 
 109. Id. at 344-45. 
 110. Id. at 347. 
 111. Id. at 349. 
 112. Mashaw, supra note 92, at 886.  
 113. Id.; see also Solum, supra note 92, at 259 (“The participation model holds that procedural fairness re-
quires that those affected by a decision have the option to participate in the process by which the decision is 
made.”); Alexandra D. Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545, 554 (2012) 
[hereinafter Lahav, Due Process] (“The dignitary theory of due process focuses on the importance of individual 
participation in litigation.”). 
 114. TRIBE, supra note 93, at 666 (emphasis in original); see also id. (explaining that a “hearing represents a 
valued human interaction in which the affected person experiences at least the satisfaction of participating in the 
decision that vitally concerns her”). 
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1. The Underlying Values 
Numerous values underlie the process-based theory of procedural due process—
mainly, autonomy, dignity, legitimacy, and equality. 
a. Autonomy 
As described by Professor Robert Bone, the due process “ideal in American adjudi-
cation is linked to a process-oriented view of adjudicative participation that values partic-
ipation for its own sake. Participation is important because it gives individuals a chance to 
make their own litigation choices.”115 More directly, litigants should not only have a 
chance to make their own litigation decisions, they should retain control over their claims. 
“[T]he true relationship between participation and self-respect is that participation . . . 
gives the participant control over the process of decisionmaking.”116 Professor Redish de-
scribes this autonomy value as “a foundational belief in the value of allowing individuals 
to make fundamental choices about the judicial protection of their own legally authorized 
rights.”117 
b. Dignity 
Related to ensuring that litigants retain control over their claims is the dignity value 
underlying a process-based theory of due process. Emphasizing a litigant’s control also 
emphasizes a litigant’s dignity. This dignity value is best developed by Professor Jerry 
Mashaw. Plainly, “[w]e all feel that process matters to us irrespective of result” and “[w]e 
do distinguish between losing and being treated unfairly.”118 He continues, “it is common-
place for us to describe process affronts as somehow related to disrespect for our individ-
uality, to our not being taken seriously as persons.”119 Professor Michelman has also ex-
plored the importance of the participation itself, explaining that “a participatory 
opportunity may also be psychologically important to the individual: to have played a part 
in, to have made one’s apt contribution to, decisions which are about oneself.”120 In the 
same way, providing the opportunity for participation itself has intrinsic value because it 
enables litigants “an opportunity that expresses their dignity as persons.”121 
                                                          
 115. Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 96, at 619.  
 116. Mashaw, supra note 92, at 903 (emphasis added). 
 117. Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Pro-
cedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1578 (2007).  
 118. Mashaw, supra note 92, at 888. 
 119. Id.   
 120. FRANK I. MICHELMAN, FORMAL AND ASSOCIATIONAL AIMS IN PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, in DUE 
PROCESS: NOMOS XVII 127 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977). Professor Michelman also 
explains that participation is important because of its external consequences, like possibly “persuading the agent 
away from the harmful action.” Id. But participation is also psychologically important even if “the decision, as 
it turns out, is the most unfavorable one imaginable and one’s efforts have not proved influential.” Id. at 128; but 
see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 
127, 130 n.10 (2011) (noting that Professor Michelman’s conclusion is made “without exploring empirical data 
or psychological research”). 
 121. TRIBE, supra note 93, at 666. 
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Another value underlying a process-based theory of due process that is less related 
to autonomy and dignity is legitimacy. Providing the opportunity to participate has a “le-
gitimizing effect in the eyes of the litigant.”122 “Individuals are presumed to have no legit-
imate complaint if they were allowed to present their case in the way they chose to present 
it—or, to put it another way, had their ‘day in court.’”123 
Legitimacy is important because if laws are seen as illegitimate, citizens feel free, 
morally, to disregard them.124 Only when legitimate laws are “authoritative” do they “cre-
ate content-independent obligations of political morality, to obey judicial decrees, and to 
respect the finality of judgments.”125 
Professor Solum looks to legislation as an analogy for the need for legitimacy within 
adjudication. Required procedures must be followed for legislation to be viewed as legiti-
mate; even if good policy, legislation will be seen as illegitimate if proper procedures were 
not followed.126 The same is true for adjudication, which is really just a different form of 
lawmaking.127 The procedures that must be followed in adjudication include “affording 
those who are bound a right to participate.”128 Regardless of the accuracy of the result, it 
will only be legitimate if an opportunity to participate was provided. 
d. Equality 
The last main value underlying a process-based theory is equality. The equality value 
is simply the idea that all individuals should have equal opportunities to participate.129 It 
demands that “the techniques for making collective decisions not imply that one person’s 
or group’s contribution (facts, interpretation, policy argument, etc.) is entitled to greater 
respect than another’s merely because of the identity of the person or group.”130 Like the 
dignity value, the equality value has an expressive function, not of litigants’ individual 
dignities, but of “the equal worth of individuals.”131 
Equality is valuable regardless of the outcome; if unequal, “the procedure itself is 
                                                          
 122. Redish & Katt, supra note 90, at 1889; see Solum, supra note 92, at 286 (concluding that the process-
based theory of procedural due process focusing on participation derives from legitimacy, and not from dignity, 
equality, or autonomy). 
 123. Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 753, 
769 (2007). 
 124. Solum, supra note 92, at 277-78. 
 125. Id. at 278. 
 126. Id. at 276-77.  
 127. Id. at 278. 
 128. Id. at 279. 
 129. Lahav, Due Process, supra note 113, at 555-56; see also Solum, supra note 92, at 263 (explaining that 
equality is a value “invoked in connection with the day-in-court ideal”). 
 130. Mashaw, supra note 92, at 899. Professor Redish argues that the equality value is dependent on the in-
strumental view of due process because the concern about unequal procedures matters only because the inequality 
may alter the substantive outcomes of cases. Redish & Marshall, supra note 92, at 484-85. 
 131. Lahav, Due Process, supra note 113, at 554. 
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unfair, for the adjudicator does not accord equal procedural rights to parties similarly sit-
uated in relevant respects.”132 Professor Mashaw introduced this idea of equal opportuni-
ties to participate. Others have extended the equality value to an equality of outcomes “that 
litigation reaches with respect to similarly situated individuals.”133 
2. A Flexible Level of Participation 
The Supreme Court has recognized a plaintiff’s procedural due process right to her 
day in court.134 Scholars agree this “has always been tied in an essential way to a process-
oriented theory of participation, one that values freedom of strategic choice apart from its 
impact on outcome quality.”135 The day in court right that the Court has recognized exem-
plifies the flexibility of a process-based right. The right is necessarily flexible because the 
values underlying process-based procedural due process do not translate to any certain 
level of participation. Participation could mean as much as actually appearing and arguing 
in court, or it could mean as little as doing so only through a representative.136 
                                                          
 132. Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values,” 60 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 25 (1974).  
 133. Lahav, Due Process, supra note 113, at 556. Professor Lahav separately advocates the use of damages 
sampling techniques in mass tort cases to achieve outcome equality. See generally, Lahav, Trial by Formula, 
supra note 19. 
 134. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008); see also Redish & Katt, supra note 90, at 1877 (discuss-
ing that the Court has expressed “its support for the day-in-court ideal as a dictate of due process”). In Taylor, 
the Court noted that a “deep-rooted tradition” supports “that everyone should have his own day in Court. Taylor, 
553 U.S. at 892-93. Many question, however, whether history supports this “tradition.” Sergio J. Campos, Mass 
Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1110-11 (“[P]roponents of a ‘long-standing tradition of indi-
vidual claim autonomy’ do not provide any historical support for it. In fact, many procedures, both antiquated 
and modern, do not respect a ‘day in court.’”); Lahav, Due Process, supra note 113, at 549-50 (questioning the 
tradition supporting the day in court ideal, but suggesting that “the perception of tradition may be more important 
than the true history”).    
 135. Bone, Rethinking, supra note 92, at 205; Campos, supra note 134, at 1060 (explaining that the Court has 
“[emphasized] the importance of protecting the claim and, in particular, a plaintiff’s control, or autonomy, over 
it”); Redish & Larsen, supra note 117, at 1573 (“With the melding of multiple individual claims into a single 
class proceeding necessarily comes a dramatic reduction in an individual's ability to control her lawsuit--or, in-
deed, to decide whether to pursue her claim in the first place.”); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for 
Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 72 (2003) (“The due process requirements of notice, hearing, and 
opportunity to opt out in 23(b)(3) class actions, combined with Rule 23(a)(4) representation requirements, indi-
cate that the rule makers saw some autonomy value for individual claims in class action litigation, but the strength 
of that value is uncertain and the reasons for it are not clarified in the case law.”). There is some inherent concern 
regarding the accuracy of judgments produced in aggregated litigation because of the lack of a relationship be-
tween absent class members and the class attorney. Woolley, supra note 100, at 414 (“Our system treats repre-
sentation in a class setting as posing a greater risk of erroneous deprivation of a claim than representation of an 
individual by an attorney.”). In an individualized lawsuit, a client has the authority to fire her attorney; this power 
to terminate should cause the attorney to vigorously pursue her client’s interests. Id. In a class action, however, 
an absent class member lacks control over the class attorney, reducing the incentive for vigorous pursuit of the 
absent class member’s interests. Id.; but see AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE 
LITIGATION § 2.07, cmt. e (2010) (explaining that the opt-out right “generates pressure for the representative 
parties and their lawyers to act faithfully on behalf of the represented claimants”); but see Campos, supra note 
134, at 1116 (explaining that “protecting litigant autonomy facilitates sweetheart settlements” for the class attor-
ney). And practically, the class attorney may not be able to vigorously pursue the interests of all class members; 
“the strategic goals and preferences of some class members may have to be sacrificed by class counsel.” Patrick 
Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 591 (1997). 
 136. See Campos, supra note 134, at 1111.  
[I]t is important to distinguish between a right to control a claim and the right to participate 
in a proceeding. For example, a plaintiff may still have her ‘day in court’ in the context of 
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The Court encountered a plaintiff’s potential right in having a day in court in the 
class action context—what procedural protections must be afforded to an absent class ac-
tion plaintiff before she can be deprived of her property, mainly her claim for compensa-
tory damages. The Court concluded that due process requires notice, the ability to opt-out, 
and adequate representation in class actions “wholly or predominantly for money judg-
ments.”137 Plainly, if these three things are provided, an absent plaintiff participates 
enough—he “does, in fact, receive his ‘day in court’ in the class proceeding.”138 
These specific rights—notice, opt-out, and adequate representation—further the val-
ues underlying process-based procedural due process. Without the rights to notice and to 
opt-out, the plaintiff loses her autonomy over decisions regarding how to pursue her claim; 
in fact, she loses control over whether to even file suit. Notice and the right to opt-out are 
necessary to preserve the plaintiff’s decision whether to proceed on her own and protect 
“the individual’s interest in having power to make choices about the protection of her own 
legally authorized or protected rights through resort to the litigation process.”139 Similarly, 
the rights further the dignity value by respecting class members by giving them a choice 
whether to let the claim be litigated within the class action. The choice is empowering; 
even if the class action is unsuccessful, the class plaintiff was treated with dignity by being 
given the choice of whether to remain in that class action. 
The rights to notice and opt-out also fulfill the legitimacy and equality values. If a 
class member was unable to opt-out, that class member likely will not see the results of 
                                                          
a bifurcated class action with a common-issue proceeding and individual-issue determina-
tions. Even in a non-bifurcated class action, a plaintiff can otherwise appear to present her 
own legal arguments or evidence. Admittedly, preclusion doctrine can effectively destroy 
this participatory right, but participation can still be fairly well accommodated in most 
cases . . . without giving plaintiffs control over their claims. 
Id.  
 137. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12, 811 n.3 (1985); see also AM. LAW INST., supra 
note 135, § 2.07 cmt. c (listing the absent plaintiff’s due process rights as “exit, voice, and loyalty” rights). Rule 
23 mirrors this holding; notice and opt-out rights are not required when the requested relief is wholly non-mon-
etary. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). There is no constitutional right to notice or to opt-out if the class action is 
certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2). Thus, an absent plaintiff in an action seeking injunctive relief, 
like in Dukes, has no right to notice or to opt-out. The issue of whether notice and opt-out rights are required 
when a class seeks injunctive relief and “incidental” monetary relief was present in Dukes. Before Dukes, “[a]ll 
federal circuits that had addressed the issue had permitted back pay in employment discrimination actions under 
(b)(2).” Robert H. Klonoff, Reflections on the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 533, 538 (2012). In 
its brief, Wal-Mart argued that the lack of an opt-out right meant that the class representatives could “extinguish 
the rights of millions of absent class members without even telling them about it.” Brief for Petitioner, Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 201045, at *2. The Court noted the “serious 
possibility” that Due Process requires notice and opt-out rights even if the class seeks monetary relief only inci-
dentally. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011). But the Court did not pursue that serious 
possibility further, however, because it found that the plaintiffs’ request for monetary relief was more than inci-
dental. Id. at 2560.  
 138. Redish & Larsen, supra note 117, at 1600; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Rethinking Certification and 
Notice in Opt-Out Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 637, 641 (2006) (doubting “whether an interest in partici-
pating in litigation has significant due process weight in cases where the class member is receiving adequate 
representation through the class representative and class counsel”). 
 139. Redish & Larsen, supra note 117, at 1579; see also AM. LAW. INST., supra note 135, § 2.07 cmt. e (rec-
ognizing that the right to opt-out reflects that “an individual’s ability to control the manner of adjudicating that 
individual’s claim is important” and that those who exercise it “[place] a premium on claim control”).  
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the litigation as legitimate.140 Just like legislation that was produced by the wrong proce-
dures, the result of litigation in which the plaintiffs did not get to participate will be seen 
as illegitimate even if it produced a result good for society. The equality value is also 
furthered in that all class plaintiffs who can be contacted through reasonable effort are 
treated equally by being given notice and the right to opt-out.141 
Even though notice, the right to opt-out, and adequate representation further the val-
ues underlying process-based procedural due process, these rights provide little, if any, 
actual participation. Even though an absent plaintiff retains autonomy over her decision 
whether to opt-out, she has no control over the day-to-day litigation decisions if she re-
mains in the class action.142 She does not participate personally, only through a representa-
tive. Numerous commentators have questioned how adequate representation can be the 
procedural protection guaranteed by a theory that emphasizes actual participation.143 Other 
mechanisms would better further the values. As an example, an opt-in right would likely 
be more respectful of the plaintiff’s dignity because it implies dissent from inaction.144 The 
opt-out right, on the other hand, implies consent from inaction.145 It also requires affirma-
tive conduct to preserve the right; a right that cannot so easily be lost would better express 
the plaintiffs’ self-worth and respect.146 
But the values underlying a process-based theory do not dictate any level of partici-
pation necessary to provide the plaintiff with her day in court.147 For example, “legitimacy 
                                                          
 140. Solum, supra note 92, at 316-17 (discussing that a mandatory class action, from which plaintiffs cannot 
opt-out, may violate the participatory legitimacy thesis); see also AM. LAW. INST., supra note 135, § 2.07 (listing 
opt-out rights as a method of participation within aggregation). 
 141. AM. LAW INST., supra note 135, § 2.07 cmt. f (explaining that notice is required only “to persons whose 
names and addresses are known and who can be contacted directly by mail or other means with reasonable effort,” 
which reflects the due process notion that “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances” is what’s 
required). 
 142. Redish & Larsen, supra note 117, at 1586 (explaining that absent plaintiffs “remain passive, ceding the 
control of litigation strategy to those who serve as named parties”). 
 143. Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 96, at 589 (“[T]he day-in-court right is supposed to guarantee 
each class member the opportunity to make her own litigation choices, and it is hard to see how this guarantee is 
met by someone making litigation choices for the class.”); Bone, Rethinking, supra note 92, at 204 (“[R]epre-
sentation can never be fully consistent with a personal day in court when the day in court is conceived, as it has 
been for more than a century, in terms of the individual’s freedom to make her own litigation strategy choices.”); 
Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 606 (1987) (“Participatory values, 
however, are antithetical to the idea of representative litigation, if participation is taken to mean literal presence 
before the court.”).  
 144. Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 96, at 592. Plus, the requirement of notice is only that it be sent 
properly—not that the plaintiff actually receive it. Id. at 593. Despite a lack of actual receipt, the class member 
will still be bound if she does not opt-out. Id. 
 145. Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and 
Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 592 (2011).  
 146. Id.; see also Redish & Larsen, supra note 117, at 1575 (arguing that the opt-out procedure may be un-
constitutional because it amounts to a passive waiver of the litigant’s autonomy due process right). 
 147. Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 96, at 585 (explaining that “[d]ignity and legitimacy by them-
selves have no necessary implications for the precise level of control” courts are not clear regarding “how much 
control the day-in-court right guarantees”); see also Bone, Rethinking, supra note 92, at 265 (explaining that the 
day in court ideal is based on a process-oriented theory, but “courts have never clearly spelled out the values 
served by [the] process-oriented theory”); see also id. (“[A]t no point has [the Court] articulated any firm con-
ceptual grounding or theoretical rationale for the precept. It is almost as if the Court simply intuits the normative 
basis for this important requirement of procedural due process.”). 
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does not require actual participation.”148 And requiring adequate representation likely does 
increase the legitimacy of results, even though it provides very little actual participation 
for the absent plaintiff. The values underlying a process-based theory of procedural due 
process promote participation. But the “participation” that results from their application 
can be something much less. 
V. A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO DAY IN COURT? 
Returning to the claimed right in Philip Morris and Dukes—the right to present de-
fenses—does either theory of procedural due process support it? In Philip Morris, the 
Court claimed to base the right in procedural due process.149 In Dukes, the Court referred 
to a “right” on the defendant’s part, but did not identify its basis.150 In both cases, it is clear 
that the defendant’s interest in paying damages is a protected property interest of which 
the defendant cannot be deprived without due process. 
Neither theory of procedural due process, however, supports a defendant’s right to 
                                                          
 148. Solum, supra note 92, at 275. Legitimacy also results because the trial court takes extra precaution in 
ensuring that the class representatives and their attorneys vigorously litigated the absent class members’ interests. 
AM. LAW INST., supra note 135, § 2.07 cmt. d (explaining the “practical need for judicial scrutiny” and “the 
importance of judicial oversight” of whether the absent class members are adequately represented). 
 149. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354-55 (2007). Many conclude, however, that Philip Mor-
ris was actually based in substantive due process. See e.g., Jill Wieber Lens, Procedural Due Process and Pre-
dictable Punitive Damage Awards, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19 n.12 (2012); Jeremy T. Adler, Losing the Proce-
dural Battle but Winning the Substantive War: How Philip Morris v. Williams Reshaped Reprehensibility 
Analysis in Favor of Mass-Tort Plaintiffs, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 729, 745 (2009) (arguing for a substantive due 
process component of the Philip Morris decision); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Fundamental 
Rights, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y ix, xii (2007) (listing Philip Morris as a substantive due process case); 
Sheila B. Scheuerman & Anthony J. Franze, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages: Due Process Revisited 
After Philip Morris v. Williams, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1147, 1150, 1157-89 (2008) (describing the Philip Morris 
decision as imposing a substantive limit on punitive damages). Some suspect that the Court forced the procedural 
due process basis for practical reasons; if the decision was expressly based in substantive due process, the ma-
jority may not have been able to muster enough votes. Keith N. Hylton, Due Process and Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Approach, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 345, 371 (2008) (explaining that Philip Morris imposes a substan-
tive limit and that “the use of procedural due process language . . . was somewhat inappropriate and at worst 
insincere”). If the basis of the Court’s holding were really procedural due process, the solution to the problem 
should be to provide those deprived procedural protections—define the dimension and allow the defendant to 
present the defenses. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (2003) (limiting punitive damages to only one 
award in a products liability claim and defining that one award as punishing the defendant for the harm it caused 
to society as a whole). Instead, the Court limited the substantive scope of the punishment. See infra note 219 and 
accompanying text.  
 150. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2544 (2011). Professor Judith Resnik classified the 
defendant’s right to present defenses to the individualized claims as “court-based.” Judith Resnik, Fairness in 
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
78, 150 (2011). Another has suggested that it’s based in substantive due process. Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 319, 348 (2011). In its petition for certiorari 
to the Supreme Court, Wal-Mart cited Philip Morris as authority that procedural due process includes a right to 
present defenses. Brief for Petitioner, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277), 2011 
WL 201045, at *56. It also cited two other cases. See id. at *43. The first was United States v. Armour & Co., 
which involved the enforcement of a consent decree entered into by a private party and the government settling 
potential antitrust issues. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971). The second case, Lindsey v. 
Normet, was a civil action between two parties and the Court did state that “[d]ue process requires that there be 
an opportunity to present every available defense.” Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972). The Court found 
no due process violation on this idea because there was no showing that the defendant was unable to litigate any 
defense Oregon law recognized as “available.” Id. at 69.    
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present defenses.151 No such right exists under the process-based theory because the de-
fendants were able to meaningfully affect the outcome even if unable to present specific 
evidence. And no such right exists under the outcome-based theory because the inaccuracy 
produced by sampling and considering nonparties is insignificant for due process purposes 
and individual proceedings are costly to society. 
A. Little Support from the Process-Based Participation Values 
“In the class action realm today, the threads of [a process-based] theory are picked 
up in defendants’ assertions of their rights to present individualized defenses against each 
of the plaintiffs.”152 Even if the threads are apparent in the defendants’ assertions, a pro-
cess-based theory of procedural due process does not support a defendant’s right to present 
defenses. Defendants, especially in the contexts of Philip Morris and Dukes, are able to 
meaningfully influence the outcomes of their adjudications, and are thus receiving all of 
the procedural protections due under the process-based theory. 
As an initial matter, the values underlying a process-based theory of due process do 
not apply as well to a defendant as they do to a plaintiff. The autonomy value seeks to 
protect a litigant’s control over her claims and litigation, but a defendant does not have the 
right to control the litigation. The defendant does not choose the venue, the resulting pro-
cedural rules, the legal claims, etc. After the plaintiff has made those decisions, the de-
fendant reacts. The defendant develops a responsive litigation strategy and controls that 
defense, but the plaintiff dictates the scope of that defense through its choice of legal 
claims and its presentation of evidence. Similarly, consider the legitimacy value. Nor-
mally, parties can have little complaint if “they were allowed to present their case in the 
way they chose to present it.”153 But defendants do not present a “case,” they present a 
defense, and how they present that defense will depend on how the plaintiff proceeds. 
Assuming that the values do apply to a defendant’s right, though, a process-based 
                                                          
 151. In a recent article, Professor Mark Moller argued that there is no historical support for a right to present 
defenses. See generally Mark Moller, Class Action Defendants’ New Lochnerism, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 319 
(2012). “In the old common law, there was simply no absolute right to present any particular quantum of evi-
dence.” Id. at 348. Instead, courts were free to use their judgment to “forbid, not just restrict, the defendant’s 
power to submit any probative rebuttal evidence.” Id.; see also id. at 320 (“[C]lass action defendants’ arguments 
are not rooted in the historical meaning of the Due Process Clause. Their arguments, instead, feed off intuitions 
about good policy.”). There is likely similarly no historical support for a right to present defenses in the more 
specific punitive damages context. “In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, punitive damages 
were undoubtedly an established part of the American common law of torts. It is just as clear that no particular 
procedures were deemed necessary to circumscribe a jury’s discretion regarding the award of such damages, or 
their amount.” Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1991) (Scalia. J., concurring); see also id. at 
25-26 (discussing that a large majority of appellate courts had followed the views of Theodore Sedgwick that 
punitive damages “could impose a punishment on the defendant and hold up an example to the community”) 
(internal citations omitted); Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) (citing Theodore Sedgwick’s view 
that punitive damages serve both public and private law functions); Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Dam-
ages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 
204–206 (2003) (explaining that punitive damages in the 19th century above all redressed “the injury of insult 
that wounds or dishonors”). 
 152. Lahav, Due Process, supra note 113, at 555. 
 153. Redish & Berlow, supra note 123, at 769. 
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theory would protect a defendant’s right to participate meaningfully. Participation is mean-
ingful only if it provides the opportunity to influence the outcome.154 Only through mean-
ingful participation does a party retain autonomy, is a party able to express her dignity, 
and will the adjudication create legitimate results. 
Even if unable to present specific evidence, the defendants in Philip Morris and 
Dukes were able to influence the outcome. Unlike an absent class plaintiff, these defend-
ants are in court and free to present evidence. Considering Wal-Mart first, in the trials of 
the sampled claims, Wal-Mart would have been free to present general evidence of its lack 
of a discriminatory purpose—that it did not discriminate against the plaintiffs whose sam-
pled claims were tried or against any of the other plaintiffs.155 If successful, Wal-Mart 
would have been able to show that it did not engage in a practice or pattern of discrimina-
tion and would not have been liable to any plaintiffs. Additionally, Wal-Mart’s success in 
showing that the plaintiffs in the sampled claims were denied a promotion for a non-dis-
criminatory reason would have a direct effect on the non-tried claims. The invalidity rate 
from the sampled claims would be applied to the relief distributed to the plaintiffs whose 
claims were not tried. If Wal-Mart was able to establish a high invalidity rate, that rate 
would directly reduce the total amount of relief it would have been obligated to pay.156 
Similarly, the average awards resulting from the sampled claims would be applied to the 
relief distributed to the rest of the plaintiffs. If Wal-Mart was able to show that those dam-
ages were minimal, that would again directly reduce the total amount of relief Wal-Mart 
would have been obligated to pay. 
Similarly, Philip Morris was able to meaningfully influence the outcome. Philip 
Morris could present evidence about its conduct that would effectually negate any plain-
tiff’s claim—that it did not make any misrepresentation or did not realize its falsity. Sim-
ilarly, evidence that the falsity of the misrepresentation was well-known would negate any 
plaintiff’s claim.157 Philip Morris may have also been free to present general evidence that 
its conduct was not tortious; only two cases filed against Philip Morris in Oregon had ever 
gone to trial, and Philip Morris had “prevailed in a significant majority of the individual 
smoking-and-health cases that [had] ever gone to trial” throughout the nation.158 Any of 
this evidence could persuade the jury to find Philip Morris not liable at all, or even if liable, 
to find that Philip Morris did not deserve a steep punishment. 
                                                          
 154. Lahav, Trial by Formula, supra note 19, at 598; see also Woolley, supra note 100, at 415 (“Participation 
values are implemented through procedures that afford individuals an opportunity to safeguard their interests in 
a particular case by placing before the court information that may affect the outcome.”); see also Redish & 
Marshall, supra note 92, at 487 (“We value participation because we believe it can bring about a different out-
come.”); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 78 n.413 (1992) (“[T]he right to be heard 
includes the chance actually to affect the outcome of the decision.”). 
 155. Moller, supra note 151, at 330 (explaining that Wal-Mart would have been able to “[contest] the statistical 
‘pattern or practice’ evidence and the lost pay formula”). 
 156. Admittedly, this would not affect the liability determination, which would have been assumed, but it 
would affect the total damages paid.   
 157. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell et al., 951 S.W.2d 420, 429 (Tex. 1997) (concluding that the “general 
health dangers attributable to cigarettes were commonly known as a matter of law” before 1952, and thus the 
defendant would not have any duty to warn of those general health dangers after 1952).  
 158. Brief for the Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 
2190746, at *13. 
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Further, the values underlying a process-based theory of procedural due process are 
furthered by the extent of participation that Wal-Mart would have been given and Philip 
Morris was given. Depriving the defendant of the ability to present evidence specific to 
the injured parties’ whose claims were not does limit the defendant’s autonomy, but not 
by much. Wal-Mart and Philip Morris still would have had control over the evidence they 
presented—the general evidence that would apply to all injured parties, and the evidence 
specific to the plaintiffs whose claims were tried. 
Similarly, some level of respect would still be accorded to Wal-Mart and actually 
was accorded to Philip Morris. Both defendants would have still had the psychological 
satisfactions of actually being able to participate. These defendants’ situation is not similar 
to the class plaintiff who would lose her claim without even the psychological satisfaction 
of choosing to remain in a class; these defendants are in court. 
The key to the dignity value is whether parties, even if they lose, still feel as if they 
were treated fairly within the proceedings.159 As long as there’s enough evidence that the 
results of the sampled claims truly represent what would be the results if all claims were 
tried, there is little affront to Wal-Mart’s dignity.160 If a defendant was unable to present 
any defenses relevant to whether its conduct was tortious, yet was still punished as if its 
conduct to everyone was tortious, then that would offend the defendant’s dignity. But that 
also was never the case. Even if unable to bring up defenses specific to a nonparty, the 
defendant was always able to present evidence that its conduct was not tortious—evidence 
that would negate both the plaintiff’s and any other injured person’s claims. Again, the 
affront to dignity was minimal.161 
Although Wal-Mart and Philip Morris may have found the results illegitimate be-
cause of their inability to present specific evidence, legitimacy does not depend on subjec-
tive desires.162 Legitimacy also “is not an ‘all or nothing’ concept. Procedures with full 
rights of participation may confer a greater degree of legitimacy, but procedures with min-
imal participation still confer some legitimacy.”163 And the procedures provided—the abil-
ity to present defenses specific to the tried claims and those applicable generally to the 
                                                          
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 118-119.  
 160. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782 (9th Cir. 1996) (mentioning the expert testimony that 
“examination of a random sample of 137 claims would achieve ‘a 95 percent statistical probability that the same 
percentage determined to be valid among the examined claims would be applicable to the totality of claims 
filed’”). 
 161. Defendant was unable to argue that “Nonparty Jane Smith would be unable to prove fraudulent misrep-
resentation because she could not show justifiable reliance due to her knowledge of the dangers of smoking.” At 
the same time, the plaintiff also hadn’t presented evidence that “Nonparty Jane Smith was also injured as a result 
of the defendant’s tortious conduct.”  
 162. Cf. Solum, supra note 92, at 274 (“Satisfaction that is merely subjective cannot confer normative legiti-
macy.”). 
 163. Id. at 319. In making this statement, Professor Solum is assuming that further participation would be 
impracticable, like how further participation by absent class members would be impracticable because of man-
agement issues. Under this theory, if participation is impractical, adequate representation will still achieve the 
desired legitimacy. Id. at 317. The same analysis could apply to a defendant’s presentation of defenses. It is 
theoretically possible—through many individualized trials. But it would be impracticable because of manage-
ment issues. When impracticability is considered, less participation is acceptable. But that lower amount of par-
ticipation will still achieve some level of legitimacy.     
25
Lens: Tort Law's Deterrent Effect and Procedural Due Process
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014




tried and untried claims—do confer some legitimacy.164 
The process-based due process value least apparent in the defendants’ inability to 
present evidence specific to other injured persons is the equality value. This is because 
only large defendants will face this inability. Sampling and punishment for harming non-
parties will only be relevant in situations where a defendant has committed tortious con-
duct against many, many people. Defendants not in class actions will obviously never have 
to face sampling. And defendants whose conduct has affected only one individual will not 
face any possibility of being punished for harming nonparties. At the same time, the equal-
ity value assumes equality among similarly situated parties.165 Potentially all defendants 
whose conduct is state or nation-wide could be subject to sampling or the imposition of an 
all-encompassing punitive damage award. These defendants are, in that way, similarly sit-
uated and are all equally affected. 
Thus, all of the values are furthered in the extent of participation the defendants 
would have had, even if unable to present evidence specific to the injured persons whose 
claims are not tried. True, the values underlying process-based procedural due process 
would be furthered more by allowing the defendant to present that evidence, but a process-
based right is flexible. One need look no further than a plaintiff’s day-in-court right to see 
that. Plaintiffs seeking compensatory damages can be precluded from pursuing their 
claims because of a prior class judgment if the plaintiffs were sent notice, were informed 
of their right to opt-out, and were adequately represented. If given those protections, the 
plaintiff has participated enough. Similarly, the defendants in Philip Morris and Dukes 
were able to participate meaningfully even if unable to present evidence specific to injured 
persons whose claims are not tried. The flexibility of process-based procedural due process 
means this theory does not support the defendant’s right envisioned in Philip Morris and 
Dukes. 
B. Little Support from an Outcome Based Theory 
As a refresher, an outcome-based view of procedural due process requires proce-
dures necessary to achieve substantively accurate outcomes. An outcome based concern is 
apparent in both Dukes and Philip Morris because of how the defendant’s liability to in-
jured persons is simply assumed. Sampling assumes liability to all whose claims are not 
tried, and considering nonparties in imposing punitive damages assumes liability to all 
persons injured by the defendant’s conduct. 
The concern is apparent, but an outcome-based procedural due process right does 
not exist unless the benefits of the procedure outweigh the costs. Even though individual-
ized proceedings would lead to more accurate liability determinations, that added accuracy 
                                                          
 164. The idea of degrees of legitimacy is especially relevant to the punitive damages context. Regardless of 
the procedures used, the damages may always be seen as illegitimate. Numerous complaints exist—why does the 
plaintiff get the entire award, why does the state get to take a portion of the award (if state law allows this), why 
doesn’t the award have any direct relationship to the facts of the case, why is a jury empowered to hand out 
punishment, why is the jury not given more directions regarding how to set the amount of the award, why is the 
award arbitrarily capped at a certain amount (if state law mandates this), why is the jury still able to hear evidence 
of the defendant’s harming nonparties even though it can’t punish the defendant for it, etc.   
 165. Mashaw, supra note 92, at 899.  
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is inconsequential. That is because, even if liability is inaccurately assumed, the damage 
obligations produced by both sampling and considering nonparties are accurate. Individu-
alized proceedings thus do not improve the accuracy of the interested protected by due 
process—the obligation to pay damages. 
The extensive costs of individualized proceedings easily outweigh the inconsequen-
tial added accuracy. Those costs are the same consequences as tort law’s under-litigation 
problem—uncompensated injured persons and the crippling of tort law’s deterrent effect. 
And thus, even though the Court seems concerned about substantive accuracy in both 
Dukes and Philip Morris, an outcome-based procedural due process theory does not sup-
port a defendant’s right to present defenses in either case. 
1. Individualized Proceedings Cure Only an Inconsequential Inaccuracy 
Sampling and considering nonparties produce inaccurate liability determinations. 
But the inaccurate liability determinations produced by sampling and considering nonpar-
ties have little consequence because they do not translate to inaccurate total damage deter-
minations. To the contrary, the total damage obligations—the interest protected by due 
process—produced by sampling and considering nonparties are accurate. Thus, using in-
dividualized proceedings would not provide an improvement in a way that actually matters 
from a due process perspective. 
a. Inaccurate Liability Determinations 
Sampling results in payment to plaintiffs whose claims were not tried; payment to 
those plaintiffs means liability to those plaintiffs.166 Liability to those plaintiffs means, 
legally, Wal-Mart denied each of those plaintiffs a promotion for a discriminatory reason. 
This is likely factually inaccurate. Surely at least some of the female employees were de-
nied a promotion because of poor work habits. Rationally, the Court was troubled by this 
likely factual inaccuracy. It specifically mentioned that there was never any showing that 
Wal-Mart denied those plaintiffs a promotion for a discriminatory reason—the same show-
ing that triggers Wal-Mart’s need to show a non-discriminatory reason for the non-promo-
tion. 
Similarly, considering nonparties when imposing punitive damages results in pay-
ment for harming those nonparties in the form of punitive damages. Punishment for injur-
ing nonparties effectually means that Philip Morris tortiously injured—and would be liable 
to—all Oregonian smokers. Again, this is likely factually inaccurate. Surely, at least a few 
of the smokers knew that smoking was dangerous but still did it. Again, the Court was 
rationally troubled. There was no chance to present evidence that the nonparty “was not 
entitled to damages because he or she knew that smoking was dangerous or did not rely 
upon the defendant’s statements to the contrary.”167 The reference to “damages” is the 
                                                          
 166. Payment of damages after sampling is not like a settlement; there is no denial of liability that accompanies 
the payment. 
 167. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-54 (2007).  
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nonparty’s compensatory damages. If the nonparty did not rely on the defendant’s state-
ments, the nonparty could not even establish tort liability, much less be entitled to punitive 
damages.168 
These assumed liabilities—Wal-Mart to every female employee and Philip Morris 
to every Oregonian smoker—include some “false positives,” meaning “findings of liability 
where there are none under existing law.”169 False positives are problematic because they 
can create “huge, undeserved reputation losses.”170 Although civil liability determinations 
are not thought to create the same type of stigma as criminal convictions, depending on the 
nature of the wrongdoing, a stigma can still result.171 
This is especially true in cases like Dukes and Philip Morris. A finding that a com-
pany engaged in discrimination is stigmatizing.172 And that finding in Dukes would be 
especially broad: Wal-Mart, “the Nation’s largest private employer,” discriminated not 
only against the 1.5 million female employees in the certified class but against all of its 
female employees.173 Similarly, a finding that a manufacturer is liable because its product 
injured or killed someone hurts that manufacturer’s reputation.174 Again, consider the 
                                                          
 168. This depends on the treatment of the nonparty’s conduct. If it did not rely at all on the defendant’s state-
ments, it should be unable to establish liability. But if the evidence showed reliance plus that the nonparty had 
some knowledge of the dangers of smoking that could likely be the basis for assigning the plaintiff some fault. 
Even if assigned fault, the plaintiff is still able to establish the defendant’s liability, but she receives a decreased 
compensatory damage recovery. See e.g., Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), 
vacated sub nom, Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 124 S. Ct. 56 (2003) (explaining that the plaintiff was 
assigned “50 percent of the cause of his harm” on the negligence claim and was not awarded punitive damages 
on the same, and that the jury awarded $79.5 million on the fraud claim). But the defendant would still be liable. 
Thus, the assumption of liability may be accurate. Also, the plaintiff’s assigned level of fault would not be applied 
to reduce any punitive damages awarded. See e.g., id.  
 169. Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal with Special Refer-
ence to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 195-96 (2011). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. 
REV. 269, 283 (1983) (describing the stigma of a criminal conviction); but see Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. 
Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 332 (1996) (arguing that the stigma resulting from a civil action 
brought by the government or even by a private individual can create a stigma very similar to one resulting from 
a criminal conviction); Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Be-
havior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 418 (1991) (“The empirical evidence suggests that civil enforcement of laws regu-
lating corporate behavior is just as effective in imposing reputational penalties.”). Punitive damages are also 
traditionally thought to create a stigma. Id. at 281–82 (“Thus, a punitive damages award, unlike a compensatory 
award, seems always to constitute a ‘badge of disgrace’ and to jeopardize the defendant’s good name, reputation, 
honor, and integrity.”); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]here is a stigma attached to an award of punitive damages that does not accompany a purely compensatory 
award. The punitive character means that there is more than just money at stake.”); but see Robert E. Riggs, 
Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 879 (1991).   
 172. See Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive Suite: Grease, Grit, and 
the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1615, 1618 (2004) (“Firms have complex mo-
tives to take nondiscrimination and the promotion of diversity seriously. First, at least certain forms of discrimi-
nation are both unlawful and socially illegitimate and hence present threats of potential liability and injury to 
reputation.”); Scott B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Managers and Supervisors: Recognizing Agent Liability Un-
der Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 586 (1994) (“[T]he need to maintain a good reputation in the public eye 
hopefully provides most employers with enough incentive to deter their agents from discriminating, regardless 
of the potential for legal liability.”). 
 173. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011). See supra text accompanying note 62 
(describing plaintiffs’ attempts to show commonality).  
 174. Jefferey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special Certificates of 
Merit?, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 537, 550 (1997) (“[P]roduct liability lawsuits can have tremendous negative effects 
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scope of the finding in Philip Morris: that the “country’s largest manufacturer of ciga-
rettes” lied to and injured every smoker in Oregon and deserves punishment for all of those 
torts.175 The liability determinations would reveal a broad “pattern of misconduct” and 
will, inevitably, “lower the value of the firm.”176 
In both Philip Morris and Dukes, the Court mandated individualized proceedings to 
cure the false positives resulting from assuming liabilities.177 And individualized proceed-
ings should uncontroversially lead to more accurate liability determinations in both 
cases.178 Individually trying each plaintiff’s claim in Dukes would lead to more accurate 
liability determinations regarding whether the defendant actually denied the plaintiff a 
promotion for a discriminatory reason. Similarly, individually trying each Oregonian 
smoker’s claim against the defendant would lead to more accurate liability determinations 
than what occurred in Philip Morris—essentially, the plaintiff’s attorney just mentioned 
the fact of other Oregonian smokers and left it to the jury to impose a greater punishment 
because of those smokers.179 
b. Sampling and Considering Nonparties Produce Accurate Total Damage 
Determinations 
The only effect of the inaccurate liability determination, however, is reputational. 
Harm to defendant’s reputation resulting from an inaccurate liability determination is not 
even an interest protected by procedural due process. In Paul v. Davis,180 the Supreme 
Court clarified that reputation alone is not the type of interest protected by the Due Process 
                                                          
on defendants' reputations, or even upon entire industries . . . .”); id. (“When a product is implicated in causing 
death or injury, fear and loss of public confidence can destroy years of effort spent promoting and creating a 
good reputation among consumers.”). 
 175. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), vacated sub nom, Philip Morris 
USA Inc. v. Williams, 124 S. Ct. 56 (2003).  
 176. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 171, at 332. 
 177. Donald G. Gifford, The Constitutional Bounding of Adjudication: A Fuller(ian) Explanation for the Su-
preme Court's Mass Tort Jurisprudence, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1109, 1136 n.85 (2012) (describing the Court’s con-
stitutionally based bounding of adjudication, which limits “common tort adjudication to cases between individual 
parties or well-defined and carefully-circumscribed groups,” and pointed to Philip Morris and Dukes as examples 
of this bounding).  
 178. Risk of error still exists with individualized proceedings obviously. Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy 
in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 345 (1994) (“Mistakes in determining liability 
can arise in many ways. There may be uncertainty concerning the identity of the person who committed an act, 
whether an act was committed, whether an act in fact caused the victim's injury, or whether an act was justified 
in some manner recognized by the law.”). 
 179. In the nonparty’s individualized proceeding against the “specific tortfeasor, the defendant will have ‘rea-
sonable notice of the plaintiff’s allegations of facts supporting liability,’” and be able to respond by producing 
the best information and enabling the jury to accurately determine liability. Gifford, supra note 177, at 1112. In 
Philip Morris, on the other hand, the plaintiff’s attorney just mentioned that other Oregonians had been harmed 
by the defendant’s conduct. Philip Morris was free to respond but practically had little ability to do so given the 
lack of notice. Was Philip Morris supposed to, on its own, investigate and conduct discovery on the potential 
claims of other Oregonian smokers? 
 180. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).  
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Clause.181 Thus, a person may be deprived of his reputation and have no claim to proce-
dural protections.182 
The interest that due process protects is the defendant’s obligation to pay damages. 
An outcome-based theory of procedural due process seeks to minimize “mistaken depri-
vations of property.”183 Thus, an outcome-based theory of procedural due process would 
protect a right to present defenses by mandating individualized proceedings if necessary 
to minimize mistaken deprivations of property—inaccurate damage obligations. 
Individualized proceedings are not necessary, however, to produce accurate damage 
obligations; the damages were already accurate. Even though sampling and considering 
nonparties rely on inaccurate liability determinations, both mechanisms still produce ac-
curate damage determinations. 
Numerous commentators believe that sampling can increase accuracy, mainly be-
cause of its use of “extremely accurate” “probabilistic prediction.”184 That probabilistic 
prediction produces “an amount of damages that is accurate overall.”185 The amount each 
plaintiff receives is arguably inaccurate: “at least some high damage plaintiffs will receive 
verdicts substantially lower than the verdicts they would receive from an individual 
trial.”186 But the total amount of damages the defendant will be obligated to pay is accurate. 
Because of this, “[n]o commentator has suggested that defendants have any ground to ob-
ject to sampling” based on the inaccuracy of the damages.187 Once the invalidity rate and 
                                                          
 181. Id. at 701; see also Schulze v. Broward Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 190 F. App’x 772, 773 (11th Cir. 
2006) (finding that business reputational interests, including goodwill, are not protected property or liberty inter-
ests); WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 80 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Damage to business reputation without 
more does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest.”). A protected property or liberty 
interest may exist if government conduct injures reputation in conjunction with other interests. Paul, 424 U.S. at 
701. But there is no other interest, given that there is no concern about the accuracy of the damages the defendant 
is obligated to pay. See supra Part IV.A.  
 182. Paul, 424 U.S. at 712-13. 
 183. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972). An outcome theory of procedural due process aims to 
ensure “that plaintiffs receive what they are entitled to under the substantive law.” Lahav, Trial by Formula, 
supra note 19, at 580. Or put differently, the their aims to ensure that defendants pay the amount the substantive 
law dictates. 
 184. Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and 
Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 851 (1992) (arguing that “[d]one well, aggregation . . . 
can systematically increase accuracy”). Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 
Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 97, at 584 (explaining that “if outcome quality is all that matters,” then 
“statistical sampling would not run afoul of due process, at least when the negative externalities created by indi-
vidual litigation are severe and the sampling procedure is designed properly”). 
 185. Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 97, at 572-73 (“[Sampling] can yield an extremely accurate 
average damage figure and thus an accurate total damage figure for the whole aggregation when the sample 
average is multiplied by the total number of plaintiffs.”). 
 186. Id. at 600; see also Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 
32 (2011) (“Indeed, to the extent that statistical sampling is problematic at all, it is problematic for plaintiff’s: 
While it produces an amount of damages that is accurate overall, it may distribute those damages in a less than a 
perfect fashion.”); Byron G. Stier, Jackpot Justice: Verdict Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80 TEMP. 
L. REV. 1013, 1050-51 (2007) (“Under statistical sampling, plaintiffs with relatively good claims receive less 
money under a method that averages their claims with other claims likely to receive less money.”); Alexandra 
D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 588 (2008) (“It is furthermore certain that the average 
award this procedure provides to extrapolation plaintiffs will differ from what they would have received in an 
individual jury trial.”). 
 187. Sherry, supra note 186, at 32; see also Saks & Blanck, supra note 184, at 837 (“From the defendant's 
perspective, it is hard to conceive of a reasonably well done aggregation procedure that would not deliver equally 
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average awards produced by the sampled claims is applied to the remaining plaintiffs, the 
result is an accurate amount of total damages that the defendant is obligated to pay.188 
Considering nonparties within the imposition of punitive damages does not rely on 
statistics and thus statistics cannot show that the punitive damage award imposed is accu-
rate despite the inaccurate liability assumptions. But there is also no way to show that 
relying on the inaccurate liability assumptions will produce a substantively inaccurate pu-
nitive damage award. That is because there is no definitive substantive law defining an 
accurate punitive damage award. 
Tort law is the substantive law governing punitive damages. Under tort law, the 
damages are proper to punish and deter, if necessary. The jury decides both whether to 
impose punitive damages at all, and if so, the size of the award. The imposition of the 
damages “is not controlled by any very definite rules.”189 And the law “[furnishes] virtu-
ally no yardstick for measuring the amount of the award . . . against the purpose of the 
award.”190 It is thus impossible to determine if an award is substantively accurate. “[I]t is 
possible for a jury to hear the evidence in the case, make findings of fact, correctly apply 
the law, and still, albeit unwittingly, assess damages that bear no reasonable relationship 
to the accomplishment of [punishment and deterrence] goals.”191 
Famously, two Alabama juries heard cases with strikingly similar facts, where plain-
tiffs had purchased a car misrepresented as new.192 One jury imposed no punitive damages, 
but the other imposed $4 million.193 Is either award substantively inaccurate? Plainly, tort 
law does not provide an answer. The same is true for a punitive damage award that argu-
ably encompasses punishment for harming nonparties. That punitive damage award is no 
more substantively inaccurate than any other punitive damage award imposed.194 
                                                          
or more accurate outcomes.”). 
 188. This assumes that all of the claims would be tried—the total damage award produced by sampling would 
be the same as the total of all the damage awards if all of the plaintiffs pursued their separate claims. The Court 
assumes that the female employees would actually pursue their claims against Wal-Mart, as do I with this con-
clusion. 
 189. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 16 (1991) (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. at 57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989)). 
Court review of awards is necessarily deferential to the jury. For example, an Alabama jury’s imposition of 
punitive damages is “presumed correct” by reviewing courts. Id. The fact that review is deferential also shows 
that the goal is not “accurate” awards. See Solum, supra note 92, at 246 (pointing out that any sort of deferential 
review on appeal is inconsistent with an outcome-based theory of procedural due process because its main pur-
pose is not accuracy). If an award is challenged constitutionally, courts review the award de novo, a standard of 
review more concerned with achieving the accurate result. Even if a court is able to declare an award unconsti-
tutional, meaning it is substantively inaccurate constitutionally, a court rarely takes the next step of determining 
the substantively constitutional amount. 
 191. Solum, supra, note 92, at 246 (emphasis added). Professor Lahav recently raised the issue of whether 
“accurate” compensatory damages are even possible. In her words, the assignment of tort damages is “an art 
more than a science.” Lahav, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 596. The goal of an accuracy-based view 
of procedural due process is “that plaintiffs receive what they are entitled to under the substantive law. With 
respect to the assignment of damages, [however,] that entitlement is not dictated by precise legal standards and 
has a strong cultural and contextual element.” Id. at 613. Without precise legal standards, it’s difficult to define 
an accurate result. 
 192. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 565, 565 n.8 (1996).  
 193. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 500-01 (2008).  
 194. The Supreme Court’s redefinition of the constitutional scope of a punitive damage award in Philip Morris 
could make punitive damages more “accurate” in the sense that the jury can now at least be instructed on what it 
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Because the damage obligations resulting from sampling and the consideration of 
nonparties in imposing punitive damages are already accurate, using individualized pro-
ceedings will not add consequential value to the accuracy of the proceedings. Individual-
ized proceedings would lead to more accurate liability determinations, but that inaccuracy 
affects only reputational interest, which due process does not protect. The interest that due 
process does protect is the defendant’s property interest in being obligated to pay damages. 
That interest is already accurately defined even when sampling is used or when the jury 
considers nonparties when imposing punitive damages. 
2. Reigniting the Under-Litigation Problem with Mandatory Individualized 
Proceedings 
In Dukes, the Court envisions that, after its ruling, each female class member will 
file her own individualized proceeding. The chances of each woman’s individual success, 
however, depend greatly on her ability to hire an attorney.195 And no attorney would likely 
be willing to take the case because the woman’s individual relief is so minimal. “Profes-
sionals . . . would not likely invest in individual efforts to seek the small amount of back 
pay owed (at two dollars an hour, even if several years).”196 An attorney may be interested 
if the aggregation were possible,197 but aggregation is not possible because the class action 
is simply too large (and unmanageable because sampling is unavailable).198 Mandating 
individualized proceedings requires the women to proceed individually, but they are una-
ble to do so because of their inability to hire an attorney. Thus, mandating individualized 
proceedings means claims against Wal-Mart will not proceed. 
A similar consequence results from Philip Morris. Nonparties are free to pursue their 
own claims against Philip Morris. The reality is, though, that they likely will not. For 
whatever reason, injured persons do not sue, and thus claims will likely not be brought 
against Philip Morris. 
The costs of mandating individualized proceedings are the same as the costs of tort 
law’s under-litigation problem. The first cost is specific to injured parties. Mandating in-
dividualized proceedings means that injured victims will get no redress. The women in 
Dukes are unable to obtain any relief if sampling is unavailable.199 This consequence falls 
                                                          
is punishing. A defendant is now also more able to tailor its defenses to the specific plaintiff’s allegations. Argu-
ably, however, the defendant already had this procedural ability before Philip Morris. Similarly, the defendant 
likely already had the procedural ability to present defenses regarding its harming nonparties. Regardless, no 
amount of procedural protections can make the award more accurate; the amounts the defendant will be punished, 
whether in each case or total, however, remains unverifiable substantive law wise.   
 195. Resnik, supra note 150, at 150. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class 
action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individ-
ual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the 
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”). 
 198. Id.; see also Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1240 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d sub 
nom, McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The consequence of requiring individual 
proof from each smoker would be to allow a defendant which has injured millions of people and caused billions 
of dollars in damages to escape almost all liability.”).  
 199. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1996) (identifying an injured plaintiff’s interest 
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mainly on the injured parties themselves as they are left without any ability to obtain com-
pensation, but it also falls upon society, which has an interest in ensuring that injured per-
sons are compensated. 
The second cost falls on society more generally. If legal claims against a tortfeasor 
are not pursued, or if just a few of the injured persons file suits, tort law loses its chance 
of achieving deterrence. Because the defendant is likely to never face any repercussion for 
harming the nonparty, the defendant will likely never face any repercussion for harming 
the nonparty.200 Without the threat of a lawsuit, the defendant loses any motivation to alter 
its wrongful behavior. Tort law becomes a non-factor in the defendant’s evaluations of 
possible conducts. This undermines the chances of achieving the purposes of the substan-
tive law, as the defendant feels free to commit tortious conduct without fear of recourse. 
The Court’s goal was to reduce false positives, but the effect of mandating individ-
ualized proceedings is that few lawsuits will occur. Instead of reducing inaccurate findings 
of liability, liability will not be determined one way or the other. Zero findings of liability 
(or non-liability) will occur because the claims will never reach a jury. This creates sys-
temic accuracy problems. 
Ironically, given the goal to increase accuracy, the resulting lack of lawsuits creates 
the same effects as false negatives—inaccurate findings of no liability. If a defendant is 
inaccurately found not liable, it lacks any incentive to alter its tortious behavior. False 
negatives thus undermine the underlying substantive law’s ability to achieve its pur-
poses.201 The same is true if injured persons do not sue, which they will not do if individ-
ualized proceedings are their only choice. 
3. The Extensive Costs of Mandatory Individualized Proceedings Easily Outweigh 
the Inconsequential Benefits 
The outcome-based theory of procedural due process requires that the benefits of an 
additional procedure be weighed against the costs of the same procedure. The Court used 
                                                          
in sampling as “enormous” considering that the alternative is likely no redress at all). 
 200. See Campos, supra note 134, at 1108 (“The mandatory class action is preferable for plaintiffs because it 
provides optimal deterrence.”); Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 
1410 (2009) (explaining that the cost-internalization calculation survives Philip Morris if the calculation is lim-
ited to “the likelihood that the defendant would escape having to pay for that harm” to the specific plaintiff). 
Many commentators believe that Philip Morris will hurt punitive damages’ ability to achieve deterrence. See 
e.g., Hylton, supra note 13, at *28 (“Instead of grappling with the theory of deterrence, the Court adopted a 
theory of procedural due process under which it is unconstitutional to do precisely what deterrence theory indi-
cates one should do in the case of a recidivist, infrequently punished wrongdoer.”); Micah L. Berman, Smoking 
Out the Impact of Tobacco-Related Decisions on Public Health Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 57 (2009) (explaining 
that “defendants will almost by definition be under-deterred (because not nearly all of those harmed by the con-
duct will bring their own lawsuits)”); Scheuerman, supra note 10, at 932 (“The Supreme Court has essentially 
stripped punitive damages of any general deterrence function.”); Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Dam-
ages: Why the Supreme Court Needs a Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 804-05 
(2010) (explaining that Philip Morris leaves little reason to take “socially optimal care if you are only required 
to pay for a portion of the harm you actually cause”). 
 201. See e.g., Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward A Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 
773, 780 (2009) (“False positives are onerous for employers who must bear the burden of justifying their practices 
or facing liability, while false negatives undermine the role of Title VII in identifying and eliminating discrimi-
nation.”).  
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this utilitarian approach in defining the Mathews balancing test to evaluate the need for 
additional procedural protections.202 
Plaintiffs obviously have an interest in the use of sampling and/or considering non-
parties in imposing punitive damages. Without sampling, a plaintiff might practically be 
unable to bring her claim—a class action is impossible because it is unmanageable if too 
large and she cannot find an attorney if forced to proceed individually.203 Society likely 
has a similar interest in that it wants injured parties to have some mechanism to obtain 
compensation. Society also likely has an interest in the deterrent effect achieved by the use 
of sampling and the consideration of nonparties. Without sampling and/or considering the 
nonparties in imposing punitive damages, defendants will simply not face any repercus-
sions for committing tortious or other unlawful conduct; defendants would have no incen-
tive to comply with the substantive law. These are the costs of mandating individualized 
proceedings—injured persons denied compensation and the crippling of tort law’s deter-
rent function. 
At the same time, the defendant has an interest in accurate outcomes.204 There is little 
doubt that sampling and considering nonparties produce inaccurate liability determina-
tions; liability is simply assumed and not tried. But individualized proceedings, the “addi-
tional or substitute procedural [safeguard],” adds little, if any, “value.”205 This benefit is 
minimal because of its non-effect on the already accurate damage determinations. Sam-
pling and the consideration of nonparties produce accurate damage obligations. Sampling 
ensures this using statistics, and considering nonparties produces just as accurate of puni-
tive damages as the system produces generally. 
In Mathews, part of why the defendant was not entitled to hearings before his disa-
bility benefits could be ended was because the questionnaires already used produced ac-
curate results.206 The same is true for individualized proceedings. Sampling and consider-
ing nonparties will already produce accurate damage obligations—the obligations about 
which an outcome-based theory is concerned. 
Last, the government likely has an interest in the use of sampling and considering 
nonparties. In Hilao, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government had an interest in 
using sampling because “the time and judicial resources to try the nearly 10,000 claims in 
this case would alone make resolution of the claims impossible” and trying the claims 
separately would be “wasteful” because of “[t]he similarity in the injuries suffered by 
many of the class members” and because the defendant lacked the financial assets to cover 
the damages suffered by all of the class members.207 The same sentiment can apply to 
                                                          
 202. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 203. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 786 (labeling the plaintiff’s interest in the use of sampling as “enormous”). 
 204. In Hilao, the Court characterized the defendant’s interest as “not paying damages for any invalid claims.” 
Id. The Court was not very concerned about harming this interest because the statistical analysis used by the trial 
court, however, was “extremely accurate.” Id. Based on the analysis in this Article, the defendant’s interest can 
be broader—not just about accurate damages, but also about accurate liability determinations. At the same time, 
procedural due process only attaches to an interest related to the payment of damages. 
 205. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344. 
 206. Id. at 345. 
 207. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 786. 
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considering nonparties when imposing punitive damages if the state imposed a one-award 
provision.208 In addition to the government’s practical interests, the government likely also 
shares society’s interest to avoid the costs of individualized proceedings: uncompensated 
injured parties and the crippling of tort law’s deterrence function. 
In all, the costs of individualized proceedings outweigh their benefits.209 This con-
clusion is unavoidable because of the minimal benefits of individualized proceedings. Us-
ing individualized proceedings will not lead to any more accurate damage obligations; the 
total damage obligations produced by sampling and considering nonparties are already 
accurate. Compare this very minimal increase in accuracy to the extensive costs of indi-
vidualized proceedings and the result is that a defendant lacks a right to individualized 
proceedings. 
The Court did not undertake the Mathews utilitarian balancing test in either Dukes 
or Philip Morris.210 Perhaps this is because it wanted to define a categorical outcome-
based procedural due process right—regardless of the costs, a defendant is entitled to pre-
sent defenses.211 This is obviously inconsistent with the utilitarianism exemplified in 
Mathews, where the Court recognized a flexible idea of accuracy.212 Mathews acknowl-
edged that improved accuracy cannot be the only consideration—perfect accuracy is not 
attainable and constitutionality should not be based on attempts to achieve the impossible. 
Plus, a categorical right would also be absurdly broad; the defendant would be entitled to 
any procedural protections that might improve the accuracy of the results, perhaps even 
only infinitesimally. But perfect accuracy is not possible and the Court recognizes so. 
Thus, the Court likely did not mean to define some new broad outcome-based right for 
defendants. 
Regardless of why the Court avoided weighing the costs and benefits of individual-
ized proceedings, the result of that weighing is that a defendant does not have an outcome-
based procedural due process right to individualized proceedings. Those proceedings do 
                                                          
 208. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (2003) (dictating that “[o]nly one award of punitive damages 
may be recovered in a court in this state from a defendant for any act or omission if the cause of action arises 
from product liability, regardless of the number of causes of action which may arise from such act or omission”). 
 209. See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 787 (finding no due process violation in the use of sampling); see also Saks & 
Blanck, supra note 184, at 828-29 (arguing that sampling is constitutional under Mathews). 
 210. Generally speaking, “[c]ourts have not applied the Mathews balancing test to class actions. . . . .” Campos, 
supra note 134, at 1104-05; see also Solum, supra note 92, at 255 (explaining that the Court has not used a 
balancing test to determine what process is due besides in Mathews). The Supreme Court has also never applied 
Mathews to a case involving a challenge to a punitive damage award. See generally Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (resolving a procedural due process challenge without using Mathews); see id. at 54-
57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (using Mathews to find a procedural due process violation in the procedures used 
in imposing punitive damages). 
 211. The Court did not entertain any possibility of a compromise solution—perhaps allowing Wal-Mart to put 
forth evidence of the invalidity of claims not chosen within the random sampling. See Resnik, supra note 150, at 
150 (“[T]he Wal-Mart court offered no explanation of why rights to raise defenses could be instantiated only 
through single-file procedures”). Similarly, there was no discussion of a compromise solution in Philip Morris, 
something like allowing the defendant to “[proffer] survey research that would have informed the jury about the 
percentage of nonparty victims who would not have stopped smoking even if the defendant had not misrepre-
sented facts and the percentages of claims to which the defendant had other viable defenses.” Gifford, supra note 
177, at 1151. 
 212. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.”). 
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not add meaningful accuracy and their costs are far too extensive. 
VI. STILL A PROBLEM—THE IMPLICIT BURDEN SHIFT 
Even though a defendant likely does not have a procedural due process right to in-
dividualized proceedings, there is still a problem with sampling and considering nonparties 
when imposing punitive damages, a problem that the Supreme Court missed in both cases. 
That problem has to do with the burdens in civil litigation. 
A. Excusing the Plaintiff from Showing Liability 
In civil litigation, the plaintiff has the burden to show the elements of her claim. 
Each female employee alleging discrimination against Wal-Mart would have the burden 
to show that discrimination, namely by showing a pattern of discrimination as Title VII 
dictates. Each female employee would also have to show that she was eligible for a pro-
motion that she was denied. Each smoker alleging fraudulent misrepresentation against 
Philip Morris would have the burden to show that the defendant made a misrepresentation, 
that the plaintiff actually and justifiably relied on it, and that the plaintiff was injured as a 
result. 
Placing the burden on the plaintiff naturally helps protect against false positives.213 
It minimizes the chances of inaccurately finding the defendant liable because there is no 
chance of the defendant being liable unless the plaintiff can meet her burden to establish 
the elements. 
If the burden were on the defendant, on the other hand, that would increase the 
chances of false positives as the defendant would have the burden to negate liability. Plac-
ing the burden on the defendant, however, would also decrease the chances of false nega-
tives, where a defendant is inaccurately found not liable.214 This is true because the default 
for every defendant would be liability and the defendant would be left to disprove it, in-
creasing the chances of all defendants being found liable accurately or inaccurately so. 
But in civil litigation, the defendant has no burden with respect to the prima facie 
elements; it does not have to disprove discrimination or justifiable reliance.215 The default 
is non-liability and the plaintiff has to prove liability. If the plaintiff cannot fulfill her bur-
den, the defendant wins. Thus, the defendant may win the lawsuit without ever saying a 
word. 
                                                          
 213. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1544 (2009) (“[R]elative to 
the general rule that imposes the burden of proof on the plaintiff, the incidence of false negatives (decisions 
erroneously denying the claim of independent creation) will increase, while the incidence of false positives (de-
cisions erroneously granting the claim) will decrease.”). 
 214. See e.g., Michael D. Green, Introduction: The Third Restatement of Torts in a Crystal Ball, 37 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 993, 1008-09 (2011) (discussing how the placement of the burden to prove causation on the 
plaintiff or the defendant affects the incidences of false positives and negatives). 
 215. Tort law is supposedly indifferent to false positives and false negatives; the goal is to reduce errors gen-
erally, regardless of whether those errors benefit plaintiffs or society or defendants. Carl F. Cranor, Discerning 
the Effects of Toxic Substances: Using Science Without Distorting the Law, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 545, 548 (1998).  
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The procedures in place in Dukes and Philip Morris, however, reposition that bur-
den.216 In Dukes, the class plaintiffs whose claims were not tried would never have to show 
eligibility for a promotion that they were denied (nor would this evidence be presented in 
the tried claims). Similarly, in Philip Morris, no one ever showed that the nonparties’ ac-
tually or justifiably relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations. Instead, the elements—
the class plaintiffs’ eligibility for a promotion and the nonparties’ reliance—were just as-
sumed. 
In turn, the defendants would be, or were, left to try to disprove those elements.217 
That is where the Court was focused in both cases—that the defendants never had a chance 
to disprove those elements.218 
But the defendant should not have even had to think about disproving the elements. 
That obligation should be triggered only once plaintiffs meet their initial burden. The 
plaintiffs not included in the sampling never did so in Dukes and the nonparties never did 
so in Philip Morris (nor did the named plaintiff do so on the nonparties’ behalf). The de-
fendants did not need a “right” to disprove liability because there had not been even an 
initial showing that the defendant would be liable to either the class plaintiffs whose claims 
were not tried or the nonparties. In short, a defendant’s right was not even at stake in either 
case. 
The Court did not identify this problematic burden shift in either Dukes or Philip 
Morris. But the Court’s solution in Philip Morris acknowledges it. The Court’s solution 
in Philip Morris was not a mechanism to protect the defendant’s right, but was instead a 
mechanism to reinforce the plaintiff’s obligation. 
The Court mandated individualized proceedings while redefining the substantive 
scope of punitive damages. Before Philip Morris, it was unclear whether punitive damages 
could punish the defendant just for what it did to the plaintiff, or more generally for what 
it did. And in Philip Morris, the Court answered that question: the damages can punish the 
defendant only for what it did to the particular plaintiff.219 
This substantive limitation reinforces that every injured plaintiff has the burden to 
establish the defendant’s liability, both for compensatory and punitive damages. This so-
lution is not so much about the defendant’s right; it is instead focused on the plaintiff’s 
obligation. Only once an individual plaintiff has established the defendant’s liability for 
its conduct to the plaintiff can the defendant also be punished for that conduct. 
The Court’s holding in Dukes does not at all reflect this burden shift issue. The Court 
                                                          
 216. See Moller, supra note 151, at 326-27 (discussing courts’ use of “irrebutable presumptions” in class ac-
tions). 
 217. This implicit shifting of the burden also relates to the problem of false positives versus false negatives. 
See supra Part V.B.2. A shift of the burden onto the defendant increases the chances of false negatives, inaccurate 
findings of liability. See e.g., Green, supra note 214, at 1008-09 (discussing how the placement of the burden to 
prove causation on the plaintiff or the defendant affects the incidences of false positives and negatives).  
 218. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011) (referring to the defendant’s entitlement to 
present defenses); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (focusing on the defendant’s lack 
of opportunity to present defenses). 
 219. Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 353. 
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concluded that sampling would violate the defendant’s right, which a procedural rule can-
not do.220 The Rules Enabling Act dictates that a procedural rule cannot “abridge, enlarge, 
or modify any substantive right.”221 “What matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it 
governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’ it 
is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ 
it is not.”222 
Sampling does violate the Rules Enabling Act, but not because of a defendant’s right 
as the Court identified. Instead, sampling violates the Rules Enabling Act because it alters 
a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.223 Plainly, a class plaintiff whose claim is not tried, mean-
ing that plaintiff’s eligibility for a promotion is never shown, still receives compensation. 
Sampling excuses that class plaintiff from showing eligibility, yet still gives her relief. A 
procedural rule cannot rewrite the substantive law in this way. The Court was correct that 
sampling would violate the Rules Enabling Act; it just missed that the Rules Enabling Act 
violation was based on the changes to the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, not based on 
changes to any right of the defendant. 
The Fifth Circuit recognized this problematic change in the plaintiff’s entitlement to 
relief in In re Fibreboard Corp.224 The district court planned to use sampling to try over 
three thousand asbestos cases that had been consolidated.225 The Fifth Circuit rejected 
sampling partly because of how it would alter Texas substantive law, which requires that 
an individual plaintiff prove both causation and damage.226 “The inescapable fact is that 
the individual claims of 2,990 persons will not be presented. Rather, the claim of a unit of 
2,990 persons will be presented.”227 Testimony on causation would concern only general 
causation, meaning population-based studies as opposed to evidence specific to an indi-
vidual.228 This impermissibly altered the “substantive principle” of Texas law that requires 
individual causation.229 
B. The Implications 
Sampling and consideration of nonparties in imposing punitive damages are imper-
missible, but, importantly, not because of some procedural due process right of the defend-
ant’s. Instead, the problem is the substantive law. Unlike a defendant’s right, however, 
substantive law can be changed to maximize its deterrent effect and accommodate mech-
anisms like sampling and considering nonparties.230 
                                                          
 220. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010). 
 223. Id. at 408 (mentioning that a procedural rule that would alter a plaintiff’s “entitlement to relief” would 
violate the Rules Enabling Act). 
 224. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 225. Id. at 708-09. 
 226. Id. at 711. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 712. 
 229. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d at 712. 
 230. See Id. at 712 (noting the cries for “innovation and judicial creativity” to enable litigation of mass torts, 
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A change in substantive law to maximize the substantive law’s purposes is not un-
precedented.231 Numerous states excused plaintiff’s traditional burden to establish causa-
tion if the plaintiff was injured due to ingestion of Diethylstilbestrol (DES).232 DES was a 
drug prescribed to prevent miscarriage. It was later determined that DES caused various 
health problems to the child in the womb when the mother took DES; those health prob-
lems would not be apparent until long after the mother took DES. For many reasons in-
cluding the factual difficulty of showing which manufacturer’s version of DES that the 
mom took and the need to compensate injured persons, courts simply excused plaintiffs 
from showing causation—from showing that their mothers took one of the specific de-
fendant’s version of DES. Instead, the defendant was left to disprove that fact.233 
Shifting the burden like this helped reduce false negatives and fulfilled the underly-
ing purposes of tort law. Instead of a defendant (inaccurately) escaping liability because a 
plaintiff was unable to establish which drug her mother took, the defendant was held liable 
unless able to establish that it was not causally related. Tort law’s substantive purposes 
were also fulfilled because shifting this burden helped ensure that people injured by DES 
were actually able to get compensation; that would likely not have been possible if courts 
had not altered the burden. Shifting the burden also aided tort law’s deterrent effect as 
defendants no longer wished to gamble with tortious conduct; they could still be held liable 
even if the plaintiff could not fulfill her traditional burden. 
Something similar could be done when the circumstances are such that the defend-
ant’s conduct affects many people, like the conducts in both Philip Morris and Dukes. 
Because of the under-litigation problem, these are the types of defendants unlikely to be 
deterred. In cases against those defendants, the burdens could be rewritten to accommodate 
the decreased deterrence. For example, plaintiffs whose claims are not tried in the sam-
pling, in a case like Dukes, could simply be excused from having to demonstrate eligibility. 
This is rational, public policy wise, given that those plaintiffs will receive average awards 
anyway. Similarly, in a case like Fibreboard Corp., Texas substantive law could be re-
written to require only general causation. Again, this seems rational because the plaintiff 
would receive only average awards and because even in individual claims, the plaintiffs 
                                                          
but stating that the arguments “are better addressed to the representative branches—Congress and the State Leg-
islature”). 
 231. Substantive law sometimes recognizes burden shifts in certain circumstances. See e.g., Summers v. Tice, 
199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (requiring a defendant to disprove causation when a plaintiff is injured as a result of 
multiple tortious conduct and there is an equal chance that any of the defendants caused the injury, but the plain-
tiff is practically unable to show which defendant was a but-for cause). 
 232. See e.g., Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984) (shifting the burden to the defendants 
to show that “they did not produce or market the particular type” of drug taken by the plaintiff under a theory of 
market share liability); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (holding that a defendant “will be 
held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of the market unless it demonstrates that it 
could not have made the product which caused plaintiff’s injuries”); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co.¸ 342 N.W.2d 37, 
50 (Wis. 1984) (same); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 512 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989) (same).  
 233. Under the substantive law change that New York courts adopted for the DES situation, a defendant could 
not exculpate itself from liability even if it could show that its drug did not cause the plaintiff’s injury. “It is 
merely a windfall for a producer to escape liability solely because it manufactured a more identifiable pill, or 
sold only to certain drugstores. These fortuities in no way diminish the culpability of a defendant for marketing 
the product, which is the basis of liability here.” Hymowitz, 541 N.Y.W.2d at 512.  
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rely heavily on population-based epidemiological studies to establish that exposure to as-
bestos caused their injuries.234 
With respect to punitive damages more specifically, the law could be rewritten so 
that if a plaintiff were able to prove some defined threshold regarding how the defendant’s 
conduct affected nonparties, then the burden could shift to the defendant. Or, punitive 
damages could be defined as specifically aimed at deterring the defendant from commit-
ting the conduct generally, shifting the burden and enabling the defendant to show why its 
conduct does not merit punishment. For example, Georgia law allows only one award of 
punitive damages in a products liability case to punish the defendant for all of the harm it 
caused by selling a defective product. Through the one award, that defendant could be 
deterred even though not all injured persons would sue.235 The constitutionality of this type 
of limitation is not guaranteed after Philip Morris, but it may be permissible given that 
only one award would be allowed.236 
Most importantly, though, procedural due process does not preclude the use of sam-
pling and considering nonparties. Similarly, procedural due process does not preclude the 
use of these mechanisms to alleviate the under-litigation problem. The underlying substan-
tive law poses a problem, but, unlike a procedural due process right, substantive law can 
be changed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A defendant’s potential procedural due process right to present defenses would nec-
essarily cripple efforts to alleviate tort law’s under-litigation problem. This is because a 
procedural due process right, at least as interpreted in Philip Morris and Dukes, mandates 
the trial by individualized proceedings. If individualized proceedings are required, the un-
der-litigation problem will run rampant. Plaintiffs will not sue—maybe their relief is so 
minimal that they cannot obtain an attorney, or maybe they do not even realize that they 
could sue someone. Regardless of the reason, plaintiffs do not sue. That means uncompen-
sated injured persons. But maybe even more importantly from a societal perspective, the 
fact that plaintiffs do not sue means that defendants are undeterred. Without the lawsuits, 
                                                          
 234. Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evi-
dence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 379 (1986) (“The basic impossibility of proving individual causation distinguishes 
toxic tort cases from ordinary personal injury suits. Cancers and mutations provide no physical evidence of the 
inducing agent, so direct observation of individual plaintiffs provides little or no evidence of causation in many 
instances. Often, parties must rely on epidemiological evidence, which may become the centerpiece of toxic tort 
litigation.”); Robert J. Berlin, Epidemiology as More than Statistics: A Revised Tool for Products Liability, 42 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRACTICE LAW J. 81, 86-87 (2006) (discussing how plaintiffs’ attorneys can use epidemio-
logical studies to help show individual causation even though the studies concern populations). 
 235. But see Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment 
for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 659 (2003) (listing problems with one-award provisions, 
including that “often the first case will produce a verdict before the full extent of the defendant’s malice and the 
full scope of the harm that it caused are understood”). 
 236. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Future of Classwide Punitive Damages, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1127, 
1132, 1148 (2013) (concluding that Philip Morris does not preclude certification of punitive damages classes 
“based on a societal, deterrent conceptualization of punitive damages,” meaning punitive damages focused on 
“[forcing] an actor to internalize the full costs of the harms that it has inflicted upon groups-or classes-of indi-
viduals”). 
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defendants lack any reason to avoid committing tortious conduct; it is not as if the defend-
ants will face any repercussion for committing tortious conduct. 
Despite what the Court concluded or intimated in Philip Morris and Dukes, however, 
the underlying theories of procedural due process do not support such a right. A process-
based theory would seem to support such a right because it emphasizes the importance of 
participation itself. But the process-based theory recognizes a flexible level of protection; 
that is why an absent class plaintiff’s right is satisfied merely through notice, the right to 
opt-out, and adequate representation. Similarly, the defendants in Philip Morris and Dukes 
were able to meaningfully influence the outcomes even if unable to present certain, spe-
cific evidence. 
An outcome-based right would likely better support the right claimed in Philip Mor-
ris and Dukes. It is rational to question the accuracy of results where liability is not tried, 
but assumed. At the same time, the inaccuracies in assuming liability do not translate to 
inaccurate total damage obligations. Because of the use of statistics, sampling will still 
produce an accurate amount that the defendant is obligated to pay. Because of the lack of 
defining substantive law, no punitive damage award can be shown to be substantively in-
accurate. Thus, the interest that due process protects—the obligation to pay damages—is 
determined accurately in sampling and in considering nonparties. 
Using individualized proceedings would not lead to any more accurate damages; the 
added benefit of using individualized proceedings is thus minimal, if not nonexistent. 
Compare that to the extensive costs of individualized proceedings. These costs include 
injured persons not receiving compensation, possibly because they are simply unable to—
a class action is not possible because sampling is unavailable and no attorney is interested 
in pursuing only the individual claim. The second cost is the loss of the law’s deterrent 
effect. If injured persons do not sue, the defendant is not deterred. Without the lawsuits, 
the defendant has no reason not to commit tortious conduct. These costs are extensive and 
easily outweigh the minimal benefit that individualized proceedings provide. 
Even though procedural due process does not actually support a defendant’s right to 
present defenses, sampling and considering nonparties does still pose a problem—they 
alter the burdens in the substantive law. Both mechanisms excuse injured persons from 
proving elements of the claims. In sampling, there is never any showing that the class 
members whose claims are not tried are entitled to relief. When injured nonparties are 
considering for punitive damages purposes, there is never any showing that those injured 
nonparties would be entitled to relief against the defendant. Despite the lack of these show-
ings, the defendant is liable. That cannot be. These procedural mechanisms have altered 
the substantive law, which requires a plaintiff to establish the elements of her claim. More 
specific, the procedural mechanisms have altered the substantive law that requires an in-
jured person to establish liability. 
Actually, this is still good news in the battle against tort law’s under-litigation prob-
lem. Even though the substantive law poses a problem with using sampling and punitive 
damages to combat the under-litigation problem, substantive law, unlike a procedural due 
process right, can be changed. Legislatures and even courts are free to alter the burdens to 
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improve tort law’s deterrent effect in cases where the defendant’s conduct affects many, 
but the defendant is unlikely to face any civil legal repercussions for that conduct. If some-
thing like this is not done, tort law will continue to be unable to achieve any deterrence in 
cases where a defendant has possibly harmed many, the types of cases where tort law’s 
deterrent effect is most desperately needed. 
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